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INTRODUCTION
On December 11, 2001, the World Trade Organization ("WTO")
granted full member status to the People's Republic of China
("China").2 This marked the culmination of over fifteen years of
negotiations between China and the WTO.3 More importantly, this
marked the moment when the WTO became a "world" trade
organization in the real sense of the word.4 A "world" trade
1. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Legal
Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 1, 33 l.L.M. 1144 (1994)
[hereinafter WTO].
2. See Members and Observers (listing the members of the WTO), at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/tife/org6_e.htm (last visited Nov.
19, 2002). The site divides WTO membership into member and observer status. Id.
The site also lists the date of membership for full member countries. Id.; see also
Membership, Alliances and Bureaucracy (describing that a country attains member
status when it formally is formally into the WTO), at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/tif_e /org3_e.htm#join (last visited
Nov. 19, 2002). A country negotiating membership into the WTO remains an
observer until it completes all negotiations and the WTO formally extends a
membership invitation to the country. Id.
3. See Anyuan Yuan, China's Entry into the WTO: Impact on China's
Regulating Regime of Foreign Direct Investment, 35 INT'L LAW. 195, 196 (2001)
(explaining that China first notified the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") partners of its desire to re-enter the agreement in 1986). It was not until
1994 that China began its massive campaign to enter into GATT as a full member.
Id.; see also discussion infra Part I (describing China's accession process,
including bilateral agreements between China and individual member countries, as
well as China's multilateral negotiations with the WTO leading to China's protocol
of accession). See generally General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A-1 1, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] (outlining the purpose of
the national treatment pillar), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/gatt47.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2002).
4. See David Blumental, "Reform" or "Opening"? Reform of China's State-
Owned Enterprises and WTO Accession-The Dilemma of Applying GATT to
Marketizing Economies, 16 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 198, 204-05 (1998) (stating
that a world trade organization without China is a contradiction in terms).
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organization that excluded a country with one of the world's highest
population concentrations and one of the largest domestic markets
was a contradiction in terms.5 China's accession into the WTO opens
the door to one of the largest markets in the world, a market of nearly
1.3 billion people.6
WTO members can look forward to greater access to China's
markets through fewer trade barriers.7 Increased access to China's
markets will take place through reduction of obvious barriers to
trade, such as tariffs and quotas, as well as a reduction in less evident
barriers, such as revising and publishing pertinent laws, enforcing
intellectual property laws, changing inspection and licensing
requirements for imports and exports, and promising uniform
application of laws for domestic and foreign products! China's open
domestic markets after WTO accession hold great opportunity for
WTO members, including the United States.'
5. See Chengfei Ding, The Protection For New Plant Varieties of American
Businesses in China After China Enters the WTO, 6 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 333, 335
(2001) (noting that the WTO cannot be considered as a global organization without
China, a country with one-fifth of the world's population and the world's second
largest population).
6. See Encyclopedia: China (stating numerous statistics on China, including
an estimated population of 1,284,303,705), at
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107411.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2002); see
also Brent T. Yonehara, Enter the Dragon: China's WTO Accession, Film Piracy
and Prospects for Enforcement of Copyright Laws, 12 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART &
ENT. L. & POL'Y. 63, 63-64 (2002) (estimating China's population at nearly 1.3
billion).
7. See discussion infra Part I (detailing general WTO requirements and
China's specific agreements).
8. See China Passes Amendments to Import/Export Inspection Law, ASIA
PULSE, Apr. 29, 2002 (affirming China's initiative to uniformly apply China's
commodity inspection law), available at 2002 WL 19015671 ; see also Yonehara,
supra note 6, at 65 (explaining steps China took to improve intellectual property
protections); Catherine R. Field, Status of the Negotiations on China's Accession
to the World Trade Organization, 817 PLI/CoMM. 7, 22-23 (2001) (noting China's
recognition that numerous laws need revision and publication).
9. See Brad L. Bacon, The People's Republic of China and the World Trade
Organization: Anticipating a United States Congressional Dilemma, 9 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 369, 387-88 (2000) (discussing the benefits of China's accession).
China's accession holds benefits for all WTO members by promoting fair trade and
establishing a dispute resolution mechanism by which all member countries abide.
Id. China's accession holds numerous specific benefits for the United States as
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This comment discusses China's WTO accession, specifically
focusing on the U.S./China bilateral negotiations relating to
treatment of agricultural products. It also addresses the commitments
China made to bring the country into compliance with WTO
regulations relating to national treatment and discrimination against
foreign products. 10  This comment argues that the Chinese
government must continue to make changes to bring China in line
with WTO obligations, but it must do so in a manner that will avoid
any detrimental impact on domestic companies and individuals."
Part I provides a brief synthesis of the old commodity inspection
law.'2 Part I also gives a brief background on China's accession
process, including the 1999 bilateral agreement with the United
States. 13 Then, Part I briefly discusses China's protocol of accession
and China's promises with all WTO members. 4
Part II examines the changes China has made since its acceptance
into the WTO, including an in-depth analysis of China's commodity
inspection law after WTO accession. 5 Part II also examines the
impact of the U.S./China bilateral agreement on agricultural
commodities. 6 This section will analyze what the changes in this
well. Id.; see also Raj Bhala, Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China's WTO
Accession Saga, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1469, 1511-19 (2000) (outlining the
specific economic and political benefits received by the United States through
bilateral negotiations with China).
10. See discussion infra Part I.B (discussing the long process of U.S./China
negotiations that finally led to an agreement).
11. See discussion infra Part III.A-D (arguing that China must reform its
domestic economy and social structure, carefully avoiding risks involved with
reforms).
12. See discussion infra Part I.C (noting the major problems addressed in
China's protocol of accession).
13. See discussion infra Part l.A-C (outlining the accession process,
specifically focusing on China's numerous attempts to finish bilateral negotiations
with the United States and multilateral negotiations with the WTO).
14. See discussion infra Part I.C (explaining the multilateral negotiations step
of WTO accession and China's major problems identified within the protocol).
15. See discussion infra Part IL.A (analyzing China's amended commodity
inspection law).
16. See discussion infra Part II.B (discussing the commitments China made in
the bilateral agreement, focusing specifically on promises relating to the
agriculture industry).
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law, as well as promises from the U.S./China bilateral agreement,
mean to U.S. commodity exporters. 7 Finally, this comment will
recommend that China should adapt slowly to WTO requirements,
but refrain from implementing additional safeguard measures while
implementing those changes. 8 While implementing reforms, China
should focus on avoiding increasing unemployment, social unrest,
and detrimental impact on domestic companies struggling to handle
the increased competition. 19
I. BACKGROUND
China's entry into the WTO means an overhaul of a large majority
of China's legal, economic, and social systems."z China began this
process in 2001 by discussing thirty new laws, passing sixteen of
which help bring China into compliance with WTO membership.2'
Although this was a step in the right direction, it was hardly adequate
to address China's necessary legal changes.22 Not only must the
17. See discussion infra Part II.C (outlining the economic benefits U.S.
commodity exporters will realize over the next few years).
18. See discussion infra Part III.A-D (recommending that China implement its
obligations over time in order to slow the impact of increased levels of
commodities).
19. See discussion infra Part III.A-D (arguing that China should focus on
meeting WTO obligations, but not lose focus on protecting its domestic economy
and society).
20. See WTO Entry Calls for Reform, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 12, 2001 (reporting
that, although Chinese companies and enterprises see a great advantage to WTO
membership, the government must face the difficult task of adapting to WTO rules
that have economic and other impacts), available at
http://search.chinadaily.com.cn/isearch/i-textinfo.exe?dbname=cndy-printedition
&listid=16270&selectword-WTO%20TRADE%20LAW (last visited Nov. 19,
2002).
21. See Mark O'Neill, Enforcement of Legislation Inadequate and Pace of
Drafting Bills Too Slow, Says Congress Chief Make Laws Stick, Says Li Peng, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 10, 2002 (explaining that the work of China's
legislature was inadequate, despite passing sixteen new laws intended to bring
China into compliance with WTO rules), available at 2002 WL 15004787.
22. See id. (noting that China's progress did not meet its obligations due to
inadequate research and discussion of the controversial issues); see also China
Amends Laws to Prepare for WTO Entry, BBC MONITORING, Mar. 4, 2001 (stating
that, after a preliminary review, China discovered more than 140 foreign trade
2003]
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Chinese government focus on legal and economic change, but it must
also deal with changing the cultural backbone of Chinese society.23
Chinese culture is not founded upon the WTO's principle of a
"rule of law," 24 rather, it is founded upon a "rule by people"
principle.25 Confucian ideologies shaped Chinese culture, creating a
society where the benefit of society rules over the benefit of the
individual and the society disfavors the rule of law.26 The Chinese
favor the concept of li,27 stability through interaction, over the penal
concept offa,28 stability through punishment.
WTO membership also means a revision of China's current state-
owned enterprise ("SOE") system, which will not only impact
China's SOEs, but will also crack Chinese citizen's traditional "iron
rice bowl" mentality.29 China protects its SOEs through laws, such as
statutes that required amending, and over 570 other administrative regulations that
the government must abolish), available at 2001 WL 15525564.
23. See Brett Williams, The Influence and Lack of Influence of Principles in the
Negotiation for China's Accession to the World Trade Organization, 33 GEO.
WASH. INT'L L. REV. 791, 792 (2001) (explaining that China, currently a rule by
people system, will not change to a rule of law system overnight).
24. See Blumental, supra note 4, at 200 (reiterating that international law is
more involved in matters that previously were left up to individual sovereign
countries).
25. See Williams, supra note 23, at 792 (commenting that it is vain to believe
that WTO membership will change China instantly from a rule by people to the
rule of law society).
26. See Yonehara, supra note 6, at 74-75 (discussing the historical
development of Chinese culture). Confucianism has developed over the course of
thousands of years to shape Chinese culture into an unfavorable view of legalism.
Id. at 75.
27. See id. (stating that the concept of li governs people's conduct and proper
etiquette). Through following li, individuals contribute to a greater society of
harmony through their interactions with friends and family. Id.
28. See Yonehara, supra note 6, at 75 (explaining thatfa is the opposite of li).
Fa is associated with legalism and the concept of punishment to maintain order. Id.
The Chinese view this rule of law concept unfavorably. Id.
29. See Yuan, supra note 3, at 216 (arguing that China's reformation of
inefficient SOEs is crucial to a successful WTO accession and that failure to do so
properly could result in higher levels of unemployment); see also Asia Society:
Glossary (defining the "iron rice bowl" as an expression that refers to China's
traditional status of employment in which SOEs provided life tenure and
comprehensive benefits to workers, regardless of their work performance),
available at http://www.asiasource.org/reference/display.cfm?wordid=1798 (last
[18:753
CHINA 'S COMMODITY INSPECTION LAW
the Corporate Law of 1993 ("Corporate Law"), which grant generous
power to the directors and management of wholly owned SOEs. 30
Not only does China's Corporate Law grant generous power to SOE
management, it also provides numerous privileges to SOEs.3'
China's current bankruptcy law provides further protection for SOEs
by preventing an SOE from filing for bankruptcy unless it receives
permission from a government agency, which differs from the
bankruptcy process for non-SOEs. 32 The State-owned Industrial
Enterprises Law of China ("SOE Law") provides further governance
for China's SOEs by promoting a separation between the SOEs and
the government.33 However, this separation never became a legal
reality. 34 The Chinese government also protects its SOEs by granting
SOEs licenses and production quotas, monopolies, and unjustified
visited Oct. 30, 2002); Ching-Ching Ni, China's 'Iron Rice Bowl' Comes Up
Empty, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 2002 (reporting that the new competitive economy in
China requires workers to adapt to a system where they are not guaranteed the
establishment of a state-supported work environment), available at
http://www.southemdigest.com/vnews/display.v/ART/2002/06/28/3d 1 b761 def83a
?inarchive= (last visited Mar. 3, 2003).
30. See Cindy A. Schipani & Junhai Liu, Corporate Governance in China:
Then and Now, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (2002) (noting that the
Corporate Law granted too much power to management, which led to irresponsible
managerial behavior).
31. See id. at 24 (describing the privileges the Corporate Law grants to SOEs).
The Chinese government waives incorporation requirements for SOEs. Id. The
Corporate Law also allows any closely held corporation incorporated by two or
more SOEs to issue corporate bonds, while other closely held corporations do not
have that ability. Id.
32. See Corporate/Debt Restructuring: Japan, the Hong Kong SAR & the
People's Republic of China a Roundtable Discussion, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 1, 22 (2002) [hereinafter Corporate/Debt Restructuring] (reprinting remarks
on China's SOEs and bankruptcy by Mr. Charles Booth). Mr. Booth commented
on China's bankruptcy law, noting that SOEs are required to receive permission
from a government agency prior to entering into bankruptcy. Id.
33. See Schipani & Liu, supra note 30, at 23 (noting that the intent of the SOE
Law is to provide governmental separation from SOEs).
34. See id. at 23 (stating that the goal of separation between government and
SOEs has been difficult to achieve).
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non-economic policy loans as well as by guaranteeing government
contracts. "
A. CHINA'S COMMODITY INSPECTION LAW PRIOR TO RECENT
AMENDMENTS
During the period of August 1, 1989, to the end of 2001, China's
commodity inspection departments inspected nearly 32.4 million
batches of commodities.36 Of those commodities inspected, over
270,000 batches failed to meet certification standards.37 When China
first developed its commodity inspection law in 1989, the
government focused on the needs of China at the time, the
development of a socialist economy. 38 As China's current
government shifted the focus of its commodity inspection law away
from developing a socialist economy to focus on meeting WTO
obligations of non-discrimination and equal treatment, the law
became outdated.39
Prior to passage of the recent amendments, Article 2 of the law
established an Administration for Import and Export Commodity
Inspection to oversee the inspection of imported and exported
35. See Yuan, supra note 3, at 216-17 (noting that China used economic and
non-economic policy treatments to favor SOEs over non-SOE companies).
36. See Zhao Huanxin, Move to Make Goods Agreeable, CHINA DAILY, May 1,
2002 (stating that, during a twelve year time period under the old commodity
inspection law, Chinese authorities inspected 32.4 million batches of goods valuing
a total of roughly $1.33 billion), available at
http://www I .chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2002-05-01/68152.html (last visited Nov. 19,
2002).
37. See China: Official Outlines Changes to Import, Export Inspection Law,
BBC MONITORING, May 1, 2002 [hereinafter Official Outlines Changes]
(explaining that the inspection standards, which disqualified over 270,000 batches
of imported commodities, have enabled China to avoid losing $26.88 billion and
has effectively protected national and consumer interests), available at 2002 WL
19949336.
38. See id. (stating that when China developed the commodity inspection law,
it focused on the economic needs of the socialist market).
39. See id. (noting that the "development and improvement of the socialist
market economy," along with entry into the WTO and other commitments,
outdated provisions of the commodity inspection law).
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commodities throughout the country.40 Article 2 further established
that local inspection authorities must implement import and export
commodity inspection at the local level. 41 Article 5 required imported
and exported products to pass the quality certification system, while
domestic products needed only to comply with the compulsory
certification system.42
Additionally, the law required imported commodities to comply
with the safety certification system applied to domestic Chinese
products.43 The dual certification requirement acted as a non-tariff
barrier to trade44 by discriminating against foreign products in the
Chinese marketplace. 45 The law further applied different standards to
40. See Law of the People's Republic of China on Import and Export
Commodity Inspection (1989) [hereinafter Law on Import and Export Inspection]
(stating that the State Council shall establish the Administration for Import and
Export Commodity Inspection to oversee the inspection process throughout all of
China), at http://www.ciq.gov.cn/doc/english/lawl.htm (last visited Nov. 19,
2002).
41. See id. (noting that, while the Administration had the power to oversee the
entire commodity inspection process, local inspection authorities were responsible
for inspecting commodities within their specific jurisdictions).
42. See China to Revise Commodity Inspection Law, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Feb. 28,
2002 (reporting that the current law requires use of the quality certification for
import and export commodities but only requires the compulsory certification
standard for products sold only in the domestic market), available at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200202/28/eng2002O228-91118.shtml (last
visited Nov. 19, 2002). The quality certification standard is a stricter standard than
the compulsory certification standard. Id. See generally Law on Import and Export
Inspection, supra note 40 (discussing the import and export commodity inspection
process).
43. See China to Revise Import-Export Rules, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 28, 2002
(noting that China required imports into the country to comply with both the
quality certification standard applicable only to imports and exports as well as the
safety certification that domestic commodities must obtain), available at
http://www.china.org.cn/english/BAT/27742.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2002).
44. See Constance Z. Wagner, The New WTO Agreement on Financial Services
and Chapter 14 of NAFTA: Has Free Trade in Banking Finally Arrived?, 5
NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV. AM. 5, 23 (1999) (stating that non-tariff barriers to trade
are much less transparent than barriers caused by tariffs). Non-tariff barriers to
trade can include import licensing procedures, customs valuation, government
procurement, different standards, etc. Id.
45. See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China
(WT/MIN(01)/3), paras. 188-92, (Nov. 10, 2001) (describing WTO members'
concern with the commodity inspection law and its function as a barrier to trade),
2003]
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products from different countries, creating further discrimination.46
In order to comply with WTO obligations, China amended its
commodity inspection law on April 28, 2002, which is discussed
further in Part 11.47
B. CHINA'S WTO ACCESSION
The WTO came into legal existence on January 1, 1995, following
the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, but the idea of a unified
trade organization dates back much further.48 In 1982, China became
at http://docsonline.wto.org (last visited Nov. 21, 2002). In response to members'
concerns, China confirmed that it would not impose requirements exclusively on
imported products, but would eliminate any unnecessary barriers to trade. Id.; see
also China to Amend Import, Export Law to Comply With WTO Rules, BBC
MONITORING, Feb. 27, 2002 (explaining that China's old commodity inspection
law was inconsistent with WTO regulations because of preferential treatment
afforded to domestic products), available at 2002 WL 15123624.
46. See Bacon, supra note 9, at 397 (discussing China's procedure of using
different standards contingent upon the national origin of the product); see also
1998 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Barriers, 49, Office of the United
States Trade Representative (released Mar. 31, 1998) (reporting that China adopted
a process of using different inspection standards on imports from different
countries), at http://www.ustr.gov/pdf/nte- I 998.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2002).
47. See Assembly Chief Li Peng Speaks at End of Committee Session, BBC
MONITORING, Apr. 29, 2002 (stating that the Chinese Congress revised the
commodity inspection law on April 28, 2002) available at 2002 WL 19948612.
48. See J. Steven Jarreau, Interpreting the General Agreement on Trade in
Services and the WTO Instruments Relevant to the International Trade of
Financial Services: The Lawyer's Perspective, 25 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1,
3 (1999) (indicating that the WTO came into existence in 1995). The Uruguay
Round negotiations lasted nearly eight years, concluding with the creation of the
WTO. Id. at 20; see also Blumental, supra note 4, at 200 (remarking that the WTO
is not merely a trade arm but that it "enjoys a stronger institutional identity,
broader scope and more diverse functions than its predessor" the GATT). See
generally Kevin C. Kennedy, The GATT-WTO System at Fifty, 16 WiS. INT'L L.J.
421 (1998) (recounting the history of the GATT and the development of the WTO
to better meet the purpose of the GATT system). The basic premise of the GATT-
WTO system is to liberalize trade through four core legal principles or "pillars."
Id. at 426. The four pillars are: 1) the unconditional most-favored-nation ("MFN")
obligation; 2) tariff restrictions; 3) the national treatment obligation; and 4) the
elimination of import quotas. Id. The MFN obligation requires countries to treat all
"like products" from member countries equally. Id. at 428. The WTO system does
not specifically ban tariffs, but instead seeks to reduce import tariff levels. Id. The
national treatment obligation requires a country "to treat imports from other
members no less favorably than domestic like products." Id. at 427. The final
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interested in GATT involvement and became a GATT observer
member.4 9 China began its process of GATT accession in 1986.50 In
1995, following the creation of the WTO, China began negotiations
with a WTO Working Party for its accession.5 ' The first stage of
China's WTO accession included bilateral negotiations with
interested member countries. 52 The second stage consisted of
multilateral negotiations with the WTO as an entity. 3
pillar, elimination of import quotas, seeks to allow supply and demand to
determine the price and quantity of goods sold. Id.
49. See Blumental, supra note 4, at 205 (reciting that China applied for
readmisstion to GATT after it was granted observer status); see also Bhala, supra
note 9, at 1477-79 (discussing China's acceptance as an observer member was not
China's first interaction with GATT). The Republic of China, controlled by the
Nationalist government headed by Chiang Kai-shek, was a founding member of
GATT, but it withdrew from the agreement when the Communist government took
control and the Nationalists fled to Taiwan. Id. at 1477. The Mainland Communist
government sought to have the withdrawal revoked, arguing for application of the
law of succession. Id. GATT members refused to grant the new government this
right. Id. China's attempt to enter GATT fell apart and China did not reattempt to
join GATT for many years. Id.
50. See Field, supra note 8, at 9 (stating that China submitted its request for
GATT membership on July 10, 1986). On March 4, 1987, the GATT Council
formally accepted China's request and established a Working Party to examine
China's request. Id.
51. See Blumental, supra note 4, at 206 (describing China's first steps with the
WTO, notably negotiating with a Working Party on a wide variety of issues
including trade in services, intellectual property rights, and various other non-tariff
barriers to trade); see also Bacon, supra note 9, at 377 (observing that once a
country applies for WTO membership, the country must submit a memorandum
describing its laws, policies, and regulations affecting international trade and
investment).
52. See Field, supra note 8, at 12 (noting that any "participant in the Working
Party can request formal bilateral market access negotiations"); see also
Blumental, supra note 4, at 207 (illustrating that the bilateral agreements address
the substantive issues between the applicant country and major WTO members).
53. See Timothy C. Brightbill et al., International Trade, 35 INT'L LAW. 407,
407-08 (2001) (stating that once interested WTO members conclude bilateral
agreements with China, China must negotiate a multilateral "protocol of
accession"); see also Bacon, supra note 9, at 377 (commenting that the multilateral
negotiations cannot begin until all bilateral negotiations are concluded); Field,
supra note 8, at 14 (explaining that the protocol of accession relates to the
application of WTO rules and regulations and includes the commitments of the
applicant country). Following the protocol of accession, an acceding country must
either receive consensus from all members of the Working Party or receive an
affirmative vote of two-thirds of all WTO members. Field, supra note 8, at 15.
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1. The U.S./China Bilateral Agreement
On November 15, 1999, the United States and China concluded
bilateral negotiations and reached an agreement that allowed China
to move forward in its WTO accession process.14 This historic
agreement marked the end of roller coaster like negotiations between
the two countries. 5 The U.S./China bilateral agreement not only
increased market access to China in general, but it contained
provisions that would benefit specific industries.56 China committed
to reduce agricultural tariffs, to implement a tariff-rate quota
system 5 for import of bulk commodities, and to grant U.S.
agricultural exporters increased trading rights.58
China further agreed to reduce overall tariffs from an average of
nearly twenty-five percent to just over seventeen percent. 9 China
promised to eliminate all import quotas on industrial goods by 2005
and all quotas on U.S. priority products 60 upon WTO accession. 6'
54. See Bhala, supra note 9, at 1511 (stating that the United States and China
signed a bilateral agreement that paved the way for China's accession to the
WTO).
55. See id. (detailing the historical significance of the U.S./China bilateral trade
agreement). The United States and China tried previously on numerous occasions
to reach a final agreement on commitments for both sides, but always fell short of
a final agreement. Id. at 1484-1511.
56. See Summary of U.S.-China Bilateral WTO Agreement February 2, 2000
[hereinafter U.S.-China Bilateral Agreement] (recounting China's commitments to
the United States given during the 1999 bilateral negotiations), at
http://www.uschina.org/public/wto/ustr/generalfacts.html (last visited Nov. 21,
2002). China not only agreed to general provisions, such as reduction of tariffs and
elimination of trade quotas, but also promised to open the markets of specific
industries such as agriculture, telecommunications, insurance, banking,
professional services, etc. Id.; see also Brightbill, supra note 53, at 408-09
(highlighting the major intention of the U.S./China bilateral agreement).
57. See Bhala, supra note 9, at 1512 (defining a tariff-rate quota system as a
two-tiered system in which a lower tariff rate will apply to all imports of a product
up to a predetermined threshold).
58. See discussion infra Part IL.B (discussing the specific commitments China
made to increase market access for U.S. agricultural products).
59. See Bhala, supra note 9, at 1512 (noting China's promise to reduce tariffs
overall tariffs on U.S. priority products to an average of just over nine percent).
60. See id. (listing beef, cheese, poultry, and wine as U.S. priority products);
see also The U.S.-China WTO Accession Deal: A Strong Deal in the Best Interests
of U.S. Agriculture, Feb. 9, 2000 [hereinafter Best Interests of U.S. Agriculture]
[18:753
CHINA 'S COMMODITY INSPECTION LAW
China further promised to grant all private firms full import and
export trading rights without requiring the use of a Chinese
middleman.62
In exchange for China's commitments, the United States agreed to
grant China normal trade relations on a permanent basis.6 3 This
changed China's trade status and no longer required the United
States to review China's trade practices on a yearly basis.64 This
commitment was important to China because it required the United
States to refrain from discriminating against Chinese goods, placing
China on the same trading level as other WTO members.65
(stating U.S. priority products are beef, poultry, pork, cheese, apples, oranges,
cherries, grapes, wine, and almonds), at
http://www.fas.usda.gov/info/factsheets/China/deal.html, (last visited Nov. 21,
2002).
61. See Bhala, supra note 9, at 1512 (providing an explanation of China's
agreements to reduce all import quotas).
62. See U.S.-China Bilateral Agreement, supra note 56 (discussing that over
the three years following the agreement, China will phase in trading rights for
private companies); see also Bhala, supra note 9, at 1513 (relaying China's
agreement to grant foreign firms full import and export rights).
63. See Brightbill et al., supra note 53, at 408-09 (reciting the agreement that
the United States would grant China permanent normal trade relations in exchange
for China's promise to enforce China's promises in the bilateral agreement); see
also H.R. 4444, 106th Cong. (2000) (proposing Congress authorize the President
to extend permanent normal trade relations to imports from China, provided that
the President transmit a report to Congress certifying that the terms for China's
accession to the WTO are at least equivalent to those agreed upon between the
United States and China); People's Republic of China-Trade Relations, Pub. L.
No. 106-286, 114 Stat. 180 (2000) (enacting House Resolution 4444 into law
following bicameral and Presidential approval). The law grants permanent normal
trade relations to Chinese products. Id.
64. See Brightbill et al., supra note 53, at 416 (describing the process of
granting communist countries normal trade relations); see also Trade Act of 1974,
19 U.S.C. § 2437 (2002) (discussing the power of the President to extend
nondiscriminatory treatment to countries not on normal trade relations status).
65. See Leo Wise, Trading With China, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 567, 567 (2001)
(explaining that the law authorized the permanent extension of nondiscriminatory
treatment of Chinese goods).
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2. China's Multilateral Negotiations
The development of a protocol of accession was the second stage
of China's WTO accession. 66 This protocol, unlike those of other
countries, includes specific commitments made by the Chinese
government.67 Some of China's major problems addressed in the
protocol include increasing the transparency of its laws, ensuring
uniform application of its laws throughout the country, non-
discrimination of foreign-funded enterprises and products,
liberalizing the right to trade within the country, elimination of non-
tariff trade barriers, and compliance with various WTO agreements.68
66. See Bhala, supra note 9, at 1473 (reiterating that an acceding country must
first complete bilateral negotiations in order to move to the second stage of the
accession process). The protocol of accession is a negotiation with the WTO as an
entity. Id. The protocol is essentially a contract between the acceding country and
the joint members of the WTO. 1d. at 1474. The protocol often incorporates
specific bilateral agreements into a generalized multilateral agreement. Id. Finally,
the protocol outlines the applicant country's current trade laws, noting any
necessary changes in order to comply with WTO requirements and explaining a
correction process the country must implement in order to comply with WTO
regulations. Id.; see also Field, supra note 8, at 23 (discussing China's actions in
cooperation with the information gathering process). In June of 2000, China
submitted a list of laws and regulations in contradiction to WTO regulations. Id.
China's list included thirty-eight laws that were revised in order to meet WTO
requirements, thirty-six other laws that are scheduled for revision, and one hundred
twenty "Department Ministry" rules that have been revised, abolished, or are
scheduled for revision. Id.
67. See Field, supra note 8, at 14 (explaining that China's protocol includes
specific commitments, not just references to other portions of the accession
package). A typical protocol of accession is very brief, two or three pages, and
only references commitments found in other schedules, working reports, and
annexes. Id. China's protocol includes specific commitments because of the long
history of China's accession process and the desire to avoid reopening old issues
without need. Id.
68. See Yuan, supra note 3, at 217 (discussing China's lack of transparency
relating to its trade laws). China's current legal system includes ambiguous and
highly generalized laws and regulations. Id. To further complicate the problem,
China does not have an official publication of its laws, rules, and regulations. Id.;
see also Field, supra note 8, at 26 (noting that China has agreed to the creation of a
system that ensures uniform application of WTO commitments). China promised
to use the authority of the national government to ensure that sub-national and
local governments remain in compliance with WTO standards. Id.; see also Bacon,
supra note 9, at 396-97 (outlining China's discriminatory treatment of imported
goods through inspection and certification standards). China required that all
imported manufactured goods receive a quality license prior to importation. Id. at
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On December 11, 2001, the WTO accepted China's protocol of
accession and granted China full member status.69 Following China's
accession, the Chinese government has taken steps to uphold its
commitments, including the recent amendments to its commodity
inspection law.v0
II. ANALYSIS
A. CHANGES TO CHINA'S COMMODITY INSPECTION LAW
China's accession into the WTO presents a great challenge to the
Chinese government; WTO membership means an almost complete
overhaul of the Chinese economic and legal system.7 The National
People's Congress ("NPC") produced one of China's first solid
initiatives to live up to its WTO commitments by amending China's
397. China did not honor quality certifications of many other countries, making the
certification process a non-tariff barrier to trade. Id. at 397-98. China also applied
different inspection standards to domestic and imported commodities, requiring
imports to pass standards deviating from international standards. Id. at 397. See
generally, Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China (providing
descriptions of China's negotiated commitments upon accession), at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/acc-e/completeacc-e.htm (last visited Nov.
21, 2002).
69. See Members and Observers, supra note 2 (listing China's official date of
accession).
70. See Huanxin, supra note 36 (reporting China's revision of its import and
export commodity inspection law in order to comply with WTO rules). The
revision of the law was the first legal revision undertaken since China's acceptance
to the WTO. Id.; see also Meng Yan, Words Mean Action on Trade, CHINA DAILY,
May 2, 2002 (explaining further steps China has taken to comply with WTO rules
and regulations), available at http://wwwl.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2002-05-
02/68216.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2003). China is in the process of revising its
rules on trademark law, copyright law, and drug administration law. Id. China has
also established the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation
("MOFTEC") that is responsible for increasing the transparency of the Chinese
government. Id.
71. See WTO Entry Calls for Reform, supra note 20 (stating that China's
government, upon WTO accession, has a difficult task of opening the economic
system to free trade and economic globalization). The Chinese government needs
to begin to focus on maintaining market order and creating a fair and open market.
Id. The government must reduce its involvement in the economic affairs of
domestic companies and allow for a free market economy in order to comply with
WTO rules. Id.
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Import and Export Commodity Inspection Law.72 By amending the
commodity inspection law, China has eliminated one method of
discriminatory treatment towards imported commodities.73 Both the
United States and China should realize economic benefits from the
amendments to the inspection law, however China must be prepared
to address accompanying social and economic changes.74
One of China's changes to its commodity inspection law involved
amending the purpose of the commodity inspection law.75 This new
purpose, "protecting people's health and security, protecting the
environment, preventing illegal activities and safeguarding national
security," replaces the out-dated purpose of inspecting "in the light
of the needs in the development of foreign trade."76 The revision
brings the law into compliance with Article 2 of the WTO's
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade ("Agreement on TBT").17
72. See China Passes Amendments to Import, Export Commodity Inspection
Law, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Apr. 30, 2002 (describing that China's top legislative body
amended the law on inspection of import and export commodities), available at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200204/29/eng20020429_94916.shtml (last
visited Nov. 21, 2002).
73. See China to Revise Import-Export Rules, supra note 43 (explaining how
the amendments will eliminate discriminatory treatment of imports).
74. See discussion infra Parts II.C & D (explaining that the process of opening
China's domestic markets will lead to economic benefits for both sides, but
Chinese industries and citizens may have difficulty adapting to the changes at
first).
75. See China to Revise Commodity Inspection Law, supra note 42 (stating that
the Chinese government desired to update the purpose and scope of the commodity
inspection law in order to comply with WTO requirements).
76. See id. (discussing the change in the official purpose of the commodity
inspection law).
77. See id. (reporting that the amended purpose brings the law into compliance
with the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade). The WTO Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade desires to ensure that no member country uses
technical regulations or standards to create an unnecessary obstacle to international
trade. See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations [hereinafter Agreement on
TBT] (discussing the WTO's commitment to reduce technical barriers to trade),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/17-tbt.pdf (last visited
Nov. 21, 2002).
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Article 2 of the Agreement on TBT requires member countries to
apply technical regulations to foreign and domestic products
equally. 78 Article 2 further requires members to ensure that technical
regulations do not cause unnecessary obstacles to international
trade.7 9 The change in the official purpose of the commodity
inspection law brings the law into compliance with the Agreement on
TBT by forcing China to ensure that the government will not use the
law's purpose as a technical method of restricting international
trade.8 0
The amendments to China's commodity inspection law benefit
foreign exporters because the amendments changed the official scope
and purpose of the law to protecting the lives and health of humans
and animals.8" Along with compliance with the Agreement on TBT, a
change in the purpose of the law increases transparency of China's
law by establishing a less ambiguous scope and purpose.82 By
increasing the transparency of the law, U.S. exporters can better
understand what standards they must meet in order to export into
China.83
78. See id. para. 2.1 (requiring member countries to afford foreign products
"treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national
origin"). Member countries are further required to give consideration to technical
regulations of other countries, even if those regulations differ from their own,
provided that the other regulations satisfy the objectives of the country's own
regulations. Id. para. 2.7.
79. See Agreement on TBT, supra note 77, at para. 2.2 (noting that member
countries are required to ensure that technical regulations are not "prepared,
adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary
obstacles to international trade").
80. See China to Revise Commodity Inspection Law, supra note 42 (reporting
that the change to the official purpose brings the law into conformity with the
WTO's Agreement on TBT).
81. See id. (stating that the amended law was drafted with the purpose of
protecting people's health and security, protecting the environment, preventing
illegal activities, and safeguarding national security).
82. See Bacon, supra note 9, at 396 (maintaining that China's laws lack
transparency because of a high level of ambiguity and generalization). Prior to the
amendment, the purpose of China's commodity inspection law was replete with
ambiguities. See China to Revise Commodity Inspection Law, supra note 42
(quoting the ambiguous purpose and scope of the old law).
83. See Yonehara, supra note 6, at 88 (noting that lack of transparency leads to
a misinterpretation of China's laws); see also Teresa Schroeder, Chinese
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The amendments also benefit U.S. exporters because the law
creates one uniform national certification system for all import and
export commodities.84 Prior to the changes, a commodity from the
United States sometimes received different treatment than a
commodity from a country with lower standards.8 5  This
discriminatory treatment was unfair to countries like the United
States because stricter domestic quality standards meant stricter
international quality standards for exported products. 86 Applying
different standards to commodities from different countries granted
favor to nations with lower domestic quality certifications and
punished those with stricter quality requirements.87
With the establishment of a unified national policy, imports from
the U.S. agricultural industry will receive the same treatment as
imports from every other country.88 If a product is on one of China's
Regulation of Traditional Chinese Medicine in the Modern World: Can the
Chinese Effectively Profit From One of Their Most Valuable Cultural Resources?,
II PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 687, 712 (2002) (arguing that WTO members rely on
transparency of other member countries' laws in order to determine trade
expectations and effectiveness).
84. See China to Revise Commodity Inspection Law, supra note 42 (stating that
the amendments stipulate a single uniform standard that will be used for all import
and export commodities).
85. See Bacon, supra note 9, at 396-97 (explaining that the level of inspection
of products varied depending on the country of origin). China's Import and Export
Commodity Inspection Law dictated that China should use the standard of the
country of origin in cases where China has not developed its own standard for that
particular commodity. Id. at 397; see also Regulations for the Implementation of
the Law of the People's Republic of China on Import and Export Commodity
Inspection, art. 10 (detailing that China will use the standard of the origin country
or relevant international standards, if China has not established its own standard),
available at http://www.chinae.com/resource/read.asp?id=10 (last visited June 21,
2002).
86. See Bacon, supra note 9, at 397 (noting that if China imports a commodity
from a country with lower standards than the United States, the commodity will be
inspected at that lower standard).
87. See id. (stating that China's former process of applying different inspection
standards to products originating from different countries was at odds with the
WTO's principle of granting all member countries equal treatment).
88. See China to Revise Commodity Inspection Law, supra note 42 (explaining
that the amendments create a uniform national system that will apply to imports
from all countries); see also Fu Jing, Unified Certification System to Set the
Standard, CHINA DAILY, Apr. 10, 2002 (reporting that China's new unified
certification system will use a single set of technical regulations and standards to
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existing commodity lists, it will be subject to China's domestic
quality standards; if the product is not one for which China has
established a domestic standard, it will be subject to different, but
standardized, international quality levels.89 A unified certification
system will help U.S. agricultural exporters realize economic gain
because U.S. exports will be subject to the same inspection criteria as
exports from other countries with lower domestic inspection
standards. 90
Imported products will receive the same treatment as domestic
products because domestic products and imported products need only
comply with one unified certification management system.9' The new
unified management system will use one "set of technical
regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures to
inspect commodities." 92 The Chinese government will establish the
new certification standard in three to five years, and it will apply a
new compulsory product certification standard in the interim.93
ensure that all domestic and foreign commodities are inspected according to the
same standards), available at 2002 WL 7168071.
89. See China Passes Amendments to Import, Export Commodity Inspection
Law, supra note 72 (stating that "all import and export commodities listed in the
index shall be examined in accordance with the compulsory national standards, and
those not listed shall be examined according to foreign standards designated by the
national administration for import and export commodities inspection").
90. See China to Revise Commodity Inspection Law, supra note 42 (stating that
the amendments specify a uniform system for all imports and exports); see also
Bacon, supra note 9, at 397 (explaining that the old inspection law applied
different inspection standards to products that originated in different countries).
91. See Official Outlines Changes, supra note 37 (noting that China shall
establish and apply a unified management system to both import and export
commodities and domestic products); see also Yan, supra note 70 (explaining that
the new unified system will inspect and quarantine domestic and foreign
commodities at the same level).
92. China to Revise Import-Export Rules, supra note 43 (reporting that China's
new management system will establish a single catalogue of products that are
subject to the compulsory certification standard and that all domestic and imported
products are subject to one obligatory standard certification mark).
93. See Jing, supra note 88 (explaining that the new unified system will take
time to fully implement, but that the Chinese government unveiled a new
certification in February 2002 that required domestic and imported quantities to
meet the same standard).
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Enforcing different inspection standards for imported and
domestic products violates Article 2 of the WTO's Agreement on
TBT. Article 2 requires member countries to treat foreign and
domestic products equally by applying the same technical regulations
to both sets of products.94 In addition, different inspection standards
violate one of the WTO's four "pillars," the national treatment
obligation, by according less favorable treatment to foreign
products. 95 By applying different inspection standards to imports,
China created a non-tariff barrier to trade through technical
regulations.96 The amended law no longer imposes different
inspection standards to imported and domestic products, eliminating
the technical barrier to trade.97 Furthermore, by no longer granting
domestic commodities preferential treatment, the law puts China into
compliance with the national treatment obligation.98
Finally, the amendments establish a stricter confidentiality
obligation for commodity inspection personnel. 99 Historically, China
94. See Agreement on TBT, supra note 77, art. 2, para. 1 (reiterating that
products imported from any member country should receive the same treatment as
domestic products).
95. See GATT, supra note 3, art. 111, 1 (outlining the purpose of the national
treatment pillar). GATT Art. III requires that products from any member country
be "accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of
national origin." Id. art. 111, 4.
96. See Agreement on TBT, supra note 77, paras. 2.1, 2.2 (describing that a
barrier to trade can include technical regulations that have the effect of creating
unnecessary obstacles to international trade). A technical regulation cannot be
more restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate governmental objective. Id.
97. See Jing, supra note 88 (stating that China will institute a new management
system with a single set of criteria and standards that will apply equally to
imported and domestic commodities).
98. See Official Outlines Changes, supra note 37 (noting that the unified
management system solves the problem of non-compliance with the national
treatment obligation).
99. See id. (explaining that China added a provision to the inspection law that
requires inspection personnel to increase secrecy); see also Amendment of the Law
on Inspections for Imports and Exports, CHINA LEGAL CHANGE (May 6, 2002)
(outlining the changes made to the law, including a provision on confidentiality
duties of commodity inspection personnel), available at
http://www.chinalegalchange.com/Archiv02/C0207003.html (last visited Nov. 20,
2002); China to Revise Import-Export Rules, supra note 43 (explaining that
inspection staff will be obligated to protect any commercial secrets that may be
discovered during the inspection process).
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has failed to provide adequate protection of intellectual property
rights and trade secrets. 00 China amended the commodity inspection
law in order to prevent inspection personnel from disclosing any
confidential information they gained through inspecting imported
commodities.' 0' Over the last few years, China began to implement
measures to protect intellectual property rights and trade secrets.10 2
This amendment will encourage U.S. exporters to expand exportation
of commodities by ensuring inspection personnel will protect any
intellectual property rights or trade secrets discovered during the
inspection process. 103
B. IMPACT OF THE U.S./CHINA BILATERAL AGREEMENT
The U.S.-China bilateral agreement not only paved the way for
China's acceptance into the WTO, but it also served the more
important purpose of opening China's markets to U.S. exports.'0 4 The
100. See Ding, supra note 5, at 338 (noting that the protection of intellectual
property rights is a concern for the United States). However, the Chinese culture is
hostile toward protecting intellectual property rights and trade secrets. Id. This
cultural belief dates back to Confucian teachings that writing should be for moral
teaching, not economic gain. Id. The Chinese often have followed this old
Confucian ideology, and the United States often has accused China of failing to
apply intellectual property protection laws. Id. at 339; see also Yonehara, supra
note 6, at 65 (stating that Chinese intellectual property law did not exist until
recently).
101. See Official Outlines Changes, supra note 37 (explaining one aspect of the
amended law requires inspectors to keep secrets they gain during an inspection of
foreign commodities confidential).
102. See Naigen Zhang, Intellectual Property Law Enforcement in China: Trade
Issues, Policies and Practices, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 63,
63-64 (1997) (enumerating changes China made to enforce intellectual property
rights). China's changes included the creation of numerous regulations and laws
intended to provide protection for intellectual property rights as well as enrollment
in nearly all of the important international treaties for protection of intellectual
property rights. Id. at 64.
103. See Official Outlines Changes, supra note 37 (noting that China amended
the commodity inspection law to require a higher confidentiality requirement for
commodity inspection personnel); see also Zhang, supra note 102, at 75-76
(explaining that China's efforts to increase protection of intellectual property rights
led to an increase of imports from the United States).
104. See Brightbill, supra note 53, at 408 (describing the scope of the U.S.-
China bilateral agreement). The agreement sought to reduce trade barriers into
China, eliminate restrictions on imports, and strengthen fair trade practices. Id.; see
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agreement benefits U.S. exporters through reduction of tariffs, a
decrease and eventual elimination of quotas, and a decrease of
restrictions on import rights.10 5 In exchange for these commitments,
China received permanent normal trade relations status ("PNTR")
with the United States.106 Normal trade relations 07 place China on the
same trading level as other WTO members. 08
The U.S.-China bilateral agreement contained provisions to
benefit U.S. agricultural commodity exporters in particular." 9 Prior
to the bilateral agreement, China's average tariff for U.S.
commodities was thirty-one and one half percent."0 China promised
to reduce its import tariffs on U.S. commodities to seventeen and one
half percent."' The reduction of tariffs also included a commitment
to reduce tariffs on U.S. priority products to an average of fourteen
percent. 12 Tariff reductions mean that U.S. exporters have greater
also Greg Mastel, China and the World Trade Organization: Moving Forward
Without Sliding Backward, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 981, 983 (2000) (asserting
that the bilateral agreement between the United States and China was the
"definitive breakthrough" in China's WTO accession).
105. See U.S.-China Bilateral Agreement, supra note 56 (summarizing the
commitments China made to the United States, which included reduction of
general and specific tariff rates, elimination of trade quotas, and granting U.S.
companies the right to trade and distribute within China).
106. See Brightbill et al., supra note 53, at 408-09 (detailing the U.S.'s decision
to grant normal trade relations status to China).
107. See Sean P. Feeney, The Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO
Agreement: An Inadequate Mechanism for the Resolution of International Trade
Disputes, 2 PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L.J. 99, 100 n.12 (2002) (noting that normal trade
relations commitments grant equal treatment to products from all member
countries). Equal treatment consists of non-discriminatory treatment of products
and equal tariff rates. Id.
108. See Wise, supra note 65, at 567 (explaining that the United States granted
permanent extension of nondiscriminatory treatment of Chinese goods).
109. See U.S.-China Bilateral Agreement, supra note 56 (listing the steps China
would implement in order to allow greater market access for U.S. commodities).
110. See Bhala, supra note 9, at 1512 (noting that China's tariffs on agricultural
products ranged from twenty percent to fifty percent, averaging thirty-one and one
half percent).
11. See U.S.-China Bilateral Agreement, supra note 56 (indicating China's
agreement to reduce tariffs on U.S. agricultural commodities by 2004).
112. See Best Interests of U.S. Agriculture, supra note 60 (commenting on the
lower tariff rate for U.S. priority products).
[18:753
2003] CHINA 'S COMMODITY INSPECTIONLAW 775
access to Chinese markets. 13 U.S. agricultural exporters will have an
opportunity to realize greater economic gain by selling more
commodities at lower costs or by selling the same amount of
products at current prices and realizing greater profit margins. " 4
China further agreed to implement a tariff-rate quota system for
imports of bulk commodities.'1 5 Under the tariff-rate quota system, a
portion of the quota for each commodity is reserved for private
traders." 6 The tariff rate quota system will have relatively high
thresholds, allowing U.S. exporters to import more commodities into
China under the lower tariff rate to increase economic gain.1 7 The
113. See Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Getting Along: The Evolution of Dispute
Resolution Regimes in International Trade Organizations, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L.
697, 738-39 (1999) (explaining that the purpose of international trade
organizations is to help countries realize economic benefits through overall tariff
reductions).
114. See Bacon, supra note 9, at 387-88 (arguing that increased market access
through lower tariffs, among other concessions, will provide an opportunity to
increase exports to China); see also Information on the Globalization Debate
(commenting on the benefits realized from international trade, including benefits
from gaining increased access to foreign markets), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/new/legaldoc .PDF (last visited Nov. 20, 2002).
115. See Bhala, supra note 9, at 1512 (discussing China's commitment to
establish tariff-rate quotas for bulk commodities such as barley, corn, cotton, rice,
and wheat). A tariff-rate quota is a two-tiered system in which a low tariff will be
charged against all imports of a product up to a predetermined quantity. See
generally David W. Skully, Economics on Tariff Rate Quota Administration
(discussing that once the amount of imports reaches the predetermined quantity,
the country can impose a higher tariff upon all subsequent imports of that product),
available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/tb 1893/tbl 893b.pdf (last visited
Nov. 20, 2002).
116. See Bryan Lohmar et al., WTO Accession Will Increase China's
Agricultural Imports, Apr. 2002 (stating that a portion of the quota for every
commodity is set aside for private and other non-state trading firms in order to
loosen the control of China's state trading enterprises), available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/AgOutlook/April2002/AO290f.pdf (last
visited Nov. 20, 2002); see also Bhala, supra note 9, at 1512 (explaining that a
share of the tariff-rate quotas are reserved for private traders).
117. See id. (maintaining that the quota threshold for U.S. commodities will be
high); see also Lohmar et al., supra note 116 (listing the tariff-rate quota levels for
nine major commodities). But see Kenneth Hood, Letter to USTR Zoellick on
Implementation of the TRQ Agreement by the People's Republic of China (May 3,
2002) (explaining that China's tariff-rate quota system for cotton is not high for
private cotton mills), available at http://www.cotton.org/gov/China-TRQ.cfm (last
visited Nov. 20, 2002). The cotton tariff-rate quota system allocated a quota of
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tariff rate for imports under the threshold range from one to twenty
percent, while the tariff rates for commodity imports above the
threshold are as high as seventy-one percent." 8 The increase in the
threshold levels allows U.S. exporters to export more commodities to
China under the lower tariff rates, helping them to realize greater
profits. '9
China also granted U.S. agricultural exporters the right to import
commodities into China "without going through a state-trading
enterprise or middleman."' 2 ° Prior to the U.S-China bilateral
agreement, only a limited number of companies had the rights
necessary to import and export commodities. 2' The Chinese
government reserved import and export rights for SOEs, making it
difficult for U.S. exporters to freely export their commodities into
China.'22
China's governance of SOEs, through the Corporate Law and
SOEs Law, not only has given SOEs advantages through increased
import and export rights, but it also has given SOEs advantages
through tax refunds, debt write-offs, and exclusive access to
technology and raw materials.'23 The numerous powers granted to
820,000 metric tons of cotton a year. Id. Of this amount only 50,000 metric tons is
allocated to private cotton mills. Id.
118. See Lohmar et al., supra note 116 (cataloging the various tariff rates for
nine major imported commodities).
119. See Bhala, supra note 9, at 1512 (stating that China agreed to implement a
tariff-rate quota system with a high threshold for the first tier of tariff rates). This
allows the United States to export more commodities subject to the lower, first tier,
tariff rates. Id.
120. U.S. -China Bilateral Agreement, supra note 56; see also Bhala, supra note
9, at 1512 (describing that China, for the first time, agreed to allow trade in
agricultural products between private parties).
121. See Agriculture-General (Feb. 9, 2000) (showing the state of affairs
before the agreement was signed and specifically that China restricted trading
rights by granting import and export rights only to companies with specific
authorization), at http://www.fas.usda.gov/info/factsheets/China/ag-gen.html (last
modified Aug. 2, 2001) (last visited Nov. 20, 2002).
122. See Bacon, supra note 9, at 424 (stating that SOEs have advantages over
U.S. companies because they "have free and direct access to China's domestic
market").
123. See Schipani & Liu, supra note 30, at 23 (explaining that the Corporate
Law and the SOEs Law govern Chinese SOEs and that these laws have conferred
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Chinese SOEs by the Corporate Law, the SOEs Law, the bankruptcy
laws, and other domestic favoring laws, although not explicitly
limiting foreign firms' ability to import and export, restricted foreign
firms' import and export capabilities by granting unfair protection to
China's SOEs. 124
China committed to implementing a three-year plan to allow
private U.S. companies to import most agricultural products.
125
Chinese officials refused to grant full trading rights for all
commodities; instead, they generated a select list of products that are
partially exempt from this commitment. 26 Without competing
against or using government supported SOEs, U.S. exporters will
have greater access to the Chinese market. 127
The Chinese government further committed to grant foreign firms
distribution rights within the country.'28 Under the U.S./China
bilateral agreement, China agreed to progressively phase in the right
to distribution services over the three years following the
numerous advantages only to SOEs); see also Bacon, supra note 9, at 424
(describing some of the advantages SOEs have received).
124. See Yuan, supra note 3, at 216-17 (stating that China favored SOEs by
providing economic and non-economic policy advantages ).
125. See Best Interests of U.S. Agriculture, supra note 60 (noting that China
committed to phase in unrestricted import trading rights on most commodities over
the next three years); see also Bhala, supra note 9, at 1513 (discussing China's
commitment to grant foreign firms full import and export rights over the next three
years).
126. See Agriculture - General, supra note 121 (stating China's refusal to grant
full trading rights on certain commodities, but its desire to continue trading
through its SOEs). Commodities on the list include corn, wheat, rice, and cotton.
Id.
127. See Bacon, supra note 9, at 422-24 (explaining that China's SOEs receive
many benefits from the Chinese government, including tax advantages, access to
technology and money, and access to domestic markets); see also Bhala, supra
note 9, at 1513 (stating that China granted U.S. firms the right to import and export
to and from its domestic market).
128. See Bhala, supra note 9, at 1513 (noting that China granted distribution
rights for both agricultural and industrial products). Now foreign companies will
be able to conduct their own distribution networks without the help of a Chinese
firm known as a middleman. Id. These distribution rights will be phased in over a
three to four-year period. Id. China maintained some reservations on distribution
rights, such as a restriction on the number of gasoline service stations operated by
foreign oil companies, for the first three years after China's WTO accession. Id.
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agreement.'29 U.S. firms will be able to trade freely throughout China
without the use of a Chinese company serving as a "middleman."' ' 30
The right to own and operate distribution services also includes the
right to operate in sectors related to distribution services, such as
"repair and maintenance, warehousing, trucking, and air couriers."3'
China also agreed to eliminate sanitary and phytosanitary
standards ("SPS") that are not based on scientific evidence.' 32 The
WTO's Agreement on SPS obligates WTO members to use scientific
evidence, to apply measures at an even level, to recognize the
equivalency of foreign SPS measures, and to ensure transparency of
SPS measures; however, the agreement does not require all countries
to adopt the same standards. 33 Article 2 of the Agreement on SPS
129. See U.S.-China Bilateral Agreement, supra note 56 (stating that the
bilateral agreement not only granted U.S. firms the right to import into the country
but that it also granted U.S. firms the right to own and operate distribution
networks within the country as well).
130. See Bhala, supra note 9, at 1513 (explaining that China granted foreign
firms the right to conduct their own "distribution networks, again without Chinese
middlemen").
131. See U.S.-China Bilateral Agreement, supra note 56 (discussing China's
commitment to open up sectors related to distribution services); see also Bhala,
supra note 9, at 1513 (explaining that foreign firms will have the right to maintain
wholesale or retail operations as well as to operate after-sales services and other
distribution related services).
132. See U.S.-China Bilateral Agreement, supra note 56 (stating that China
agreed to the elimination of non-scientifically based SPS barriers); see also David
S. Johanson & William L. Bryant, Eliminating Phytosanitary Trade Barriers: The
Effect of the Uruguay Round Agreements on California Agricultural Exports, 6
SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1996) (describing how SPS standards are
measures designed to protect human, plant, and animal health in the area of food
safety); Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex I A, Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, art. 2
[hereinafter Agreement on SPS] (discussing the provisions, rights, and
responsibilities of WTO members pertaining to Sanitary and Phytosanitary
measures), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/ I 5-sps.pdf (last
visited Feb. 13, 2003).
133. See Johanson & Bryant, supra note 132, at 4 (stating that the SPS
agreement now obligates WTO members to base standards on sound science, to
apply an even level of acceptable risk, to recognize the equivalency of different
procedures, and to maintain transparent and available regulations); see also
Terence P. Stewart & David S. Johanson, The SPS Agreement of the World Trade
Organization and the International Trade of Dairy Products, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.
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grants member countries the right to adopt SPS measures necessary
to protect the health of humans, plants, and animals as long as those
measures do not restrict trade and have a scientific justification.134
SPS measures often restrict trade when those measures are not based
on scientific evidence.'35
Article 4 of the Agreement on SPS forces China to accept the SPS
measures of other member countries as the equivalent of domestic
standards provided that the standards from the exporting member
country provide equivalent protection. 3 6 China may adopt standards
that are stricter than the suggested international standards if it can
scientifically justify such measures.'37 China has used unscientific
SPS measures to block agricultural imports from foreign countries,
including the United States. 3 ' China's commitment to apply only
scientifically founded SPS measures will increase the access to
J. 55, 55 (1999) (explaining that Article 3 of the Agreement on SPS measures
encourages, but does not require, a system of uniform regulations).
134. See Agreement on SPS, supra note 132, art. 2 (requiring member countries
to apply SPS measures "only to the extent necessary to protect human, plant, or
animal life or health" and that such measures are not maintained without scientific
justification).
135. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 133, at 58 (explaining that the SPS
Agreement of the WTO addresses the problem of countries using questionable
safety standards as barriers to trade); see also Johanson & Bryant, supra note 132,
at 4 (noting that SPS measures can be barriers to trade when based on scientifically
questionable standards).
136. See Agreement on SPS, supra note 132, art. 4 (requiring member countries
to accept the SPS measures of other members if the exporting member can
objectively demonstrate that its standards meet an appropriate level); see also
Stewart & Johanson, supra note 133, at 59 (outlining Article 4 of the Agreement
on SPS, which requires a country to adopt the measures of other member countries
even if the measures are different, if the measures are objectively shown to provide
similar protection).
137. See Johanson &.Bryant, supra note 132, at 5 (describing that Article 3 of
the Agreement on SPS allows for higher standards if the country can produce a
scientific justification for diverging from the international standard); see also
Agreement on SPS, supra note 132, art. 3 (maintaining that, provided a scientific
justification, a member country may apply stricter standards).
138. See Johanson & Bryant, supra note 132, at 3 (stating that China used
scientifically questionable SPS measures to block imports from California due to a
fungus that does not exist in the state).
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China's market, as China cannot ban U.S. commodities for arbitrary
reasons. 1
39
While lower tariffs, elimination of tariffs, and reduced domestic
subsidies will increase access to China's domestic markets,
scientifically questionable sanitary measures would contradict these
measures and keep China's markets closed to foreign trade. 140 The
Agreement on SPS also provides WTO member countries with a
vehicle to challenge, and possibly remove, China's protectionist
measures that are scientifically unfounded.'4' China's commitment to
apply SPS measures that are based on scientific evidence will
eliminate one more method of restricting the importation of foreign
commodities. 42
China's WTO membership and the U.S./China bilateral agreement
could cause China's markets to become dependent on foreign
economies, leading to a different domestic political, social, and
economic environment. 4 3 As a result of recent reforms and influence
from foreign markets, China's social system has experienced both
139. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 135, at 60 (discussing one purpose of
the SPS Agreement). WTO members cannot enact arbitrary and unjustified
measures that discriminate against foreign commodities and restrict access to
domestic markets. Id.
140. See Johanson & Bryant, supra note 132, at 2 (noting that while elimination
or reduction of other trade barriers has opened some foreign markets to U.S.
exports, other markets have remained closed due to scientifically questionable
sanitary and phytosanitary measures).
141. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 133, at 56 (explaining that the
Agreement on SPS provides a means to challenge the sanitary and phytosanitary
measures for dairy products if those measures are not based on scientific
evidence).
142. See U.S.-China Bilateral Agreement, supra note 56 (noting that China
agreed to eliminate non-scientifically based SPS barriers); see also Stewart &
Johanson, supra note 133, at 56 (reiterating that SPS measures based on
scientifically unfounded evidence tend to reduce trade). The Agreement on SPS
should eliminate questionable sanitary barriers to international trade. Id. at 71.
143. See Bacon, supra note 9, at 387 (stating that China's accession will cause
China's economy to become more interdependent with other economies); see also
Blumental, supra note 4, at 212-16 (describing the impact of WTO accession on
the economy, political realm, and society). WTO membership affects the
employment levels, leading to social unrest and political problems. Id. at 212.
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beneficial and detrimental changes. 144 China's Confucian culture,
lack of a "rule of law" system, and changes to social welfare have led
to a history of broken trade agreements and a long list of questions
about China's ability to operate under the WTO's "rule of law"
system. 45 As social welfare changes, China's government must focus
on maintaining social stability and upholding its political
leadership. 146
C. ECONOMIC IMPACT FOR U.S. COMMODITY EXPORTERS FROM
THE BILATERAL AGREEMENT AND MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT
China's implementation of WTO required changes opens the door
to China for U.S. products. 47 Over the past twenty years, the total
exports from the United States into China have grown to nearly $14
billion a year. 148 In 2000, the United States exported nearly $1.7
billion worth of agricultural products to China alone. 149 The
144. See Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform After Twenty
Years, 20 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 383, 402-03 (2000) (explaining the social
implications of China's reforms over the last twenty years). Reforms have led to
increased personal freedom for Chinese citizens because of the relaxation of state
control over their lives. Id. at 402; see also Blumental, supra note 4, at 212 (noting
that recent reforms have led to increased unemployment, creating urban unrest, and
increased crime).
145. See Mastel, supra note 104, at 988-91 (describing China's history of failing
to enforce previous trade agreements). China's lack of a "rule of law" is a major
reason for the failure to enforce prior agreements and commitments. Id. at 991.
China previously agreed to increase transparency of its laws, but has been very
slow in releasing rules and regulations. Id. at 990. China also previously agreed to
refrain from applying unscientific provisions to restrict importation of agricultural
products, but has failed to comply with its repeated promises. Id.
146. See Blumental, supra note 4, at 215-16 (remarking that Chinese
government officials recognize the importance of maintaining public stability).
China must focus on upholding the leadership of the government and protecting
society from jeopardy. Id.
147. See Best Interests of U.S. Agriculture, supra note 60 (discussing the
advantages to U.S. agricultural products gained by China's accession to the WTO).
148. See id. (stating that, over the past twenty years, the amount of U.S. exports
to China has increased dramatically from nearly zero to almost $14 billion per
year).
149. See China's Entry to the WTO will Slash Barriers to the Sale of American
Agricultural Products in the World's Most Populous Country (listing the volume
of U.S. agricultural exports to China for the 2000 fiscal year), at
http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/china/accession.html (last modified Dec. 18, 2002).
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U.S./China bilateral agreement, along with the amendments to the
commodity inspection law, should dramatically increase the volume
of U.S. agricultural exports to China. 5' Increased access to China's
domestic markets not only offers U.S. agricultural producers an
opportunity to export to one of the fastest growing markets but also
an opportunity to reduce the trade deficit between the United States
and China. '5'
Agricultural trade has become one of the critical elements of
international trade, accounting for roughly $450 billion per year or
twelve percent of all international trade.152 International trade of
agricultural commodities has become very important for the United
States in particular.'53 In 2000, the United States exported nearly $54
billion worth of agricultural products; this is just over twelve percent
150. See Best Interests of U.S. Agriculture, supra note 60 (noting that the
U.S./China bilateral agreement will raise the amount of agricultural commodities
the U.S. exports to China).
15 1. See Bacon, supra note 9, at 387 (describing the impact U.S. exporters will
realize as a result of China's open domestic market). In 2000, the U.S. trade deficit
with China reached nearly $84 billion. See CRS Issue Brieffor Congress, Apr. 13,
2001 (summarizing the U.S./China commercial ties, including the trade deficit),
available at http://cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/Economics/econ-35.cfm (last visited
Feb. 13, 2003). Over the past twenty-one years, China's real gross domestic
product ("GDP") has grown by an average of nine and one half percent, making it
one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Id.
152. See George E.C. York, Global Foods, Local Tastes and Biotechnology: The
New Legal Architecture of International Agricultural Trade, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L.
423, 423 (2001) (introducing the overall significance of agricultural products in the
international market); see also Johanson & Bryant, supra note 132, at 1-2 (stating
that recent trade liberalization has opened new markets for agricultural trade,
specifically for California's high value agricultural products).
153. See US Foreign Trade Highlights (listing U.S. export statistics for 1967 to
2001), at http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/industry/otea/usfth/aggregate/H0lT03.html,
(last visited July 12, 2002). In 2001, the United States exported agricultural
commodities totaling $55.2 billion, while importing only $39.5 billion. Id. While
this amount equated only to 7.6 percent of all exports, it was the only major good
that the United States exported more than it imported. Id. In 2001, agricultural
products accounted for almost one and one half percent of the U.S. GDP. See
Gross Product By Industry, (giving GDP data and percentages by industry), at
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn2/gposhr.htm (last visited July 12, 2002). However,
the percentage of agricultural products to goods is higher as this statistic includes
both services and goods, where services account for the majority of the GDP. Id.
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of the total agricultural trade for the world. 54 However, less than
three percent of those U.S. exports made their way into China. '"
The emphasis the United States places on exporting agricultural
products, coupled with the increased market access into China,
should lead to enormous opportunities for U.S. commodities.'56
China's commitments to reduce tariffs, reduce tariff rate quotas,
eliminate arbitrary SPS measures, create a unified inspection
standard, and grant U.S. exporters importation and distribution rights
remove the major barriers relating to agricultural trade.'57 China's
commitments grant U.S. businesses an opportunity to export to one
of the "world's most promising markets."' 58 This is, in part, because
China contains one-fifth of the world's population.'59 Additionally,
154. See International Trade Statistics, 2001, at 105 (listing agricultural import
and export leaders), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/rese/statis-e/its200le/stats2OOle.pdf (last visited
July 12, 2002).
155. See U.S. Agricultural Trade Briefing Room: U.S. Agricultural Trade
(illustrating that mainland China imported only 1.4 percent of U.S. commodities
traded internationally, while Hong Kong, a special administrative region of China,
imported an additional 1.4 percent of U.S. internationally traded commodities
during the period of 1997-2000), at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/agtrade/usagriculturaltrade.htm (last visited Aug.
3, 2002).
156. See Ding, supra note 5, at 333-34 (stating that the U.S. agricultural sector
has much to gain from increased access to China's markets).
157. See supra notes 36-89 and accompanying text (discussing the amendments
to China's commodity inspection law and the U.S./China bilateral agreement); see
also Ding, supra note 5, at 336 (describing what China's commitments really mean
to U.S. agricultural exporters). The terms China negotiated during its WTO
accession will open its domestic markets to foreign goods, especially U.S.
agricultural products. Id.
158. TIA's Letters to Congress Concerning Permanent Normal Trade Relations
(PNTR) to China, at
http://www.tiaonline.org/media/press-releases/2000/pntr l.cfm (Jan. 25, 2000);
see also Wine Institute Supports Permanent Normal Trade Relations With China
(stating that the bilateral agreement holds great opportunity for U.S. agricultural
products, specifically for the wine industry), at
http://www.wineinstitute.org/communications/statistics/chinatrade.htm (Mar. 27,
2000).
159. See Why PNTR (permanent normal trade relations) with China matters for
America, WASH. TIMES - HONG KONG, Apr. 6, 2000 (noting that the bilateral
agreement cuts tariffs on agricultural products by two-thirds, allowing those
products access to one of the world's largest markets), available at
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China's demand for agricultural products will continue to grow along
with its economy, further paving the way for U.S. agricultural
exports.16 0
D. THE IMPACT OF THE COMMODITY LAW AMENDMENTS AND THE
BILATERAL AGREEMENT UPON CHINA
Contrary to the U.S. trend, international trade of agricultural
commodities has remained relatively low for China. 161 Historically,
China has protected its agricultural industry and focused on
developing agriculture in order to realize agricultural self-sufficiency
and provide a secure and steady work environment for its citizens. 162
China's membership in the WTO will decrease its self-sufficiency by
causing its markets to become more entwined with and dependent on
other economies. 163 Entwined markets have two major effects on the
domestic market. Increased imports lead to numerous domestic
economic benefits, but they also can negatively impact the livelihood
of domestic industries. 64
http://www.intemationalspecialreports.com/asiapacific/00/hongkong/6.html (last
visited Feb. 13, 2003).
160. See Ding, supra note 5, at 336 (remarking that China's economic growth
has a direct relationship with demand for agricultural products). As the Chinese
people's income increases, their demand for agricultural products will also
increase, creating more opportunity for U.S. commodities. Id.
161. See International Trade Statistics, supra note 154, at 105 (explaining that
China only exported a total of $13.56 billion worth of agricultural products in
2000). This amount accounted for just over three percent of the international trade
in agricultural products. Id. China imported a total of $9.04 billion worth of
agricultural products, while Hong Kong imported an additional $9.14 billion worth
of agricultural commodities. Id.
162. See Ding, supra note 5, at 335 (noting that China has protected its
agricultural system in order to achieve a self-sufficient food system and not to
refrain from relying on imports); see also Asia Society: Glossary, supra note 29
(defining the "iron rice bowl" as a Chinese expression that guarantees Chinese
workers job security, regardless of performance); Ching-Ching, supra note 29
(noting that the "Communist rule [in China] fostered a widespread culture of
dependency").
163. See Bacon, supra note 9, at 387 (listing the effects of China's WTO
accession). By increasing access to a member country's market, the WTO
agreements create markets that are dependent upon one another. Id.
164. See id. (discussing the impact of WTO accession). WTO membership
promotes economic benefits, such as stimulating economic growth, increasing
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The Chinese government saw WTO membership as a rational way
to benefit China's domestic economy. 6 5 First, WTO membership
means Chinese goods have greater access to foreign markets.'66
Under the U.S./China bilateral agreement, the United States granted
China PNTR status, putting Chinese products on the same level as
imported products from other foreign countries. 6 ' This commitment
gives Chinese products greater access to U.S. markets.'68 China also
will realize economic benefit from the increased quantities of foreign
goods imported into its domestic market.'69
personal income levels, and decreasing the cost of living. Id.; see also Yuan, supra
note 3, at 196 (explaining that China's sheltered industries, including farming, are
ill-prepared for the global competition that accompanies WTO membership);
Bhala, supra note 9, at 1523-24 (noting that China's agricultural produce prices
were thirty percent above the world price due to government protection);
Blumental, supra note 4, at 238 (stating that the basic premise of the GATT system
is to increase wealth, helping people live better).
165. See Bhala, supra note 9, at 1479 (describing that China's desire to join the
WTO generated from its economic self-interest); see also Blumental, supra note 4,
at 216 (quoting Zhu Rongji as noting that China cannot achieve economic growth
as an isolated country).
166. See Williams, supra note 23, at 808 (noting that China stands to gain from
the elimination of discriminatory treatment towards its exports); see also Bhala,
supra note 9, at 1479-80 (stating the ways in which China would benefit from
WTO accession). WTO membership not only means lower tariffs on major
exports, but also reduction of other non-tariff barriers. Id. Chinese products
entering the United States are no longer subject to quotas, allowing Chinese
companies to export more products into the United States. Id.
167. See Gregory C. Ott, China's Accession into the WTO: The Practice of
International Bribery and the Issues it Presents for American Counsel Whose
Clients are Doing Business Within the Confines of the Great Wall, 15 TEMP. INT'L
& COMP. L.J. 147, 149 (2001) (explaining that, because of the U.S./China bilateral
agreement and granting PNTR to China, Chinese products receive the same tariff
rates as products from other WTO members); see also CRS Report: 1B93107 -
Normal-Trade-Relations (Most Favored Nation) Policy of the U.S. [hereinafter
CRS Report: IB93107] (describing normal trade relations), available at
http://cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/Economics/econ-49.cfm# 1 4 (June 7, 2000).
Normal trade relations, previously Most Favored Nation, status simply promises to
grant all countries equal trade concession, privileges, or immunities. Id.
168. See Ott, supra note 167, at 149 (noting that PNTR status allows Chinese
products greater access to the U.S. domestic market).
169. See Ding, supra note 5, at 336 (explaining that both the United States and
China will benefit from less restricted trading). Under a comparative advantage
theory, both countries benefit because each country has different strengths. Id.; see
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Unlike China's labor-intensive industry, the U.S. agricultural
industry is land and capital intensive, allowing U.S. producers to
farm more land per capita. 70 The difference in modernization grants
the United States a comparative advantage in the production of
agricultural products that leads to lower prices. 17' With open markets,
the United States can produce and export its commodities at a price
below Chinese domestic prices, providing less expensive products
for Chinese citizens. 72 China's domestic prices will decrease not
only because U.S. companies are more efficient, but because such
efficiency also helps influence Chinese prices from local producers
through increased competition. 73 However, increased competition
also Bacon, supra note 9, at 387 (stating that freer trade helps to raise income
levels and provide a broader choice of goods for individuals).
170. See Ding, supra note 5, at 336 (discussing the difference in the
modernization levels of agricultural production in the United States and China);
see also Bhala, supra note 9, at 1523-24 (noting that the average U.S. farmer
worked 1.4 hectares of land, while the average Chinese farmer worked only .1
hectares).
171. See Bhala, supra note 9, at 1524 (explaining that the prices of agricultural
products in China are nearly thirty percent higher than the world prices); see also
Steven Suranovic, The Theory of Comparative Advantage - Overview,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY AND POLICY LECTURE NOTES (1997) (describing
the theory of comparative advantage), available at
http://intemationalecon.com/vI.0/ch40/40c000.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2002).
Under the theory of comparative advantage, a country that is more efficient at
producing one good should produce and export that good, leading to the most
efficient overall production. Id.
172. See Daniil E. Fedorchuk, Acceding to the WTO: Advantages for Foreign
Investors in the Ukrainian Market, 15 N.Y. INT'LL. REV. 1, 13 (2002) (noting that
the GATT and WTO systems are based upon the theory of comparative
advantage). An efficient country can import at lower prices when markets are more
open to foreign products. Id.; see also Cheryl W. Gray & William W. Jarosz, Law
and the Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment: The Experience From Central
and Eastern Europe, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 8-9 (1995) (stating that, if
states are free to trade, the markets of those states will adjust to allow the state with
greater efficiency in production of a particular good to produce and trade that
good).
173. See Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values, 30
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 429, 446 (1997) (explaining that elimination of tools of
protectionism (tariffs, quotas, domestic subsidies, etc.) allows foreign products
increased access to the domestic market, leading to the development of more
efficient local firms).
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for local producers is not always beneficial; it can be detrimental if
the domestic firms are not ready to compete with the foreign firms. 17 4
China's state protected companies are going to have difficulty
adjusting to the global competition accompanying WTO
membership.'75 Chinese officials predict that WTO required reforms
will lead to the dismissal of ten million domestic employees over the
next few years.'76 As unemployment rises, social unrest and crime
also may rise.'77  China's agricultural industry has received
government protection, through SOEs and government subsidies, for
many years.'78 China used high tariffs, quotas, and inspection
regulations to ensure its domestic agricultural industry would remain
protected from foreign competition.'79 With increased access into
China's market, foreign commodities will increase, making it
difficult for inefficient domestic producers to compete. 80 The
Chinese firms' inability to compete will lead to a loss of employment
174. See Yuan, supra note 3, at 196 (arguing that China's businesses and
industries may be ill-prepared for the global competition that accompanies WTO
membership). The state-owned enterprises in farming, telecommunications, and
banking, which have grown accustomed to governmental shelter, will have an
especially difficult time dealing with the competition. Id.
175. See id. (stating that Chinese businesses and industries, particularly the
SOEs, are "ill-prepared" for increased global competition).
176. See Blumental, supra note 4, at 212 (discussing the impact from recent
reforms on SOEs). China's unemployment rate has been rapidly increasing as a
result of required SOE reforms. Id.
177. See id. (noting that, as Chinese unemployment rates increased, the urban
unrest and crime have become a major problem for the Chinese government); see
also Lubman, supra note 144, at 403 (explaining that crime in China has increased
since the beginning of economic reform, provoking concern about social order).
178. See Yuan, supra note 3, at 196 (noting that the farming industry has
received governmental protection); see also Ding, supra note 5, at 335 (stating that
China's agricultural products market is highly protected, so that China can attain
food self-sufficiency).
179. See supra notes 71-142 and accompanying text (discussing the old
commodity inspection law, the changes brought about by the amendments, and the
U.S./China bilateral agreement).
180. See Mastel, supra note 104, at 985-86 (explaining that the agricultural
industry has historically been one of the most protected industries in China).
"Chinese agriculture is likely to have difficulty matching the global competition."
Id.
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for a substantial number of Chinese citizens. 8' As more imports
enter China's market, the Chinese government and its citizens must
find ways to adapt without recreating barriers to trade. 182
Economic reforms also have led to an increase in the income
disparity and further development of economic classes for Chinese
citizens. 8 3 The disparity between rural and urban areas continues to
draw more Chinese to the cities in search of higher incomes. 8 4 In
February 2000, the scare of increasing income disparity and the
closure of inefficient SOEs led to a riot at the Yangjiazhangzi
Mine. 85 The government called in the People's Liberation Army
("PLA") to restore order at the mine. 186 Thus, the Chinese
government must be prepared for more such incidents as it closes
down additional inefficient SOEs and its economy feels the impact of
foreign competition. 87
181. See id. at 986 (noting that the increased competition from global producers
could displace a large number of Chinese working in the agricultural sector).
182. See discussion infra Part III.A (discussing how China should adapt to the
increased competition from foreign exporters).
183. See Lubman, supra note 144, at 403 (stating that income disparity among
Chinese citizens is growing). The disparity between individuals is not only
increasing between rural and urban areas, but is a general phenomenon as well. Id.
184. See id. (noting that the difference in earnings continues to draw more
peasants from the countryside to the cities). This has created a "floating
population" of nearly one hundred million Chinese in search of work. Id.
185. See Bhala, supra note 9, at 1482-83 (describing the reaction of mine
workers when the government closed the state-owned mine). Over 20,000 workers
and families burned cars, barricaded streets, smashed windows, set fires, and
fought with the People's Armed Police in retaliation to the news. Id.
186. See id. (explaining that the PLA restored order only after firing warning
shots above the crowd).
187. See id. at 1483 (stating that the riot at the Yangjiazhanzi mine was a
"frightening symbol of what was to come").
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CHINA SHOULD REFRAIN FROM IMPLEMENTING ADDITIONAL
SAFEGUARD MEASURES
The WTO's Agreement on Safeguards allows countries to
implement temporary safeguard measures"' in order to protect a
domestic product or industry if that product or industry is under
extreme foreign competition.189 Article 2 of the WTO's Agreement
on Safeguards requires the member country to meet three conditions
prior to the implementation of any additional safeguard measures: 1)
there must be an absolute or relative increase in the quantity of
imports; 2) the increase of imports must cause, or threaten to cause,
serious injury to a domestic industry producing a similar product;
and 3) there must be a causal link between the increased imports and
the injury or threat of injury. 190 Furthermore, under Article 2, China
cannot discriminate when implementing safeguard measures or
purposefully target imports from one country; rather, China must
target all imports of certain products.191 Additionally, the goal of any
safeguard is to promote the healthy development of trade by
188. See Wise, supra note 65, at 571 (noting that the term "safeguard" refers to
certain "retaliatory measures, such as tariffs and quotas, that countries impose in
reaction to increased import competition in a particular category of goods").
189. See Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, Final Text of the GATT
Uruguay Round Agreements Including the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, art. 2 [hereinafter Agreement on Safeguards],
(stating that a member of the WTO may enact safeguard measures to protect
domestic industries from like or directly competitive foreign products), available
at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/25-safeg.pdf (last visited Nov. 20,
2002).
190. See Lihu Chen & Yun Gu, China's Safeguard Measures Under the New
WTO Framework, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1169, 1178 (2002) (describing the
requirements that must be met in order for China to implement safeguard measures
against imported commodities); see also Agreement on Safeguards, supra note
189, art. 2 (stating that a member may apply safeguard measures only if that
member has determined "that such product is being imported into its territory in
such increased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, and under
such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic
industry that produces like or directly competitive products").
191. See Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 189, art. 2 (explaining that
safeguard measures shall be applied to all imports, regardless of their source).
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providing an environment for strengthening the competitiveness of
domestic producers. 192
China may implement safeguard measures only to the extent
necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and allow the country
to adjust to the increased level of imports. 19 3 Thus, safeguard
measures serve the dual roles of providing a "safety release valve"
when the pressure from international competition becomes too great
and facilitating the competitive capability of domestic producers.1
94
Currently, China has a few measures in place to provide the
protection necessary to relieve the pressures of international
competition. 195
Under the U.S./China bilateral agreement, China will be able to
keep certain safeguard measures in place for a few more years,
giving the domestic agricultural industry time to adjust to increased
competition.'96 Furthermore, China did not officially implement the
amended commodity inspection law until October 1, 2002, again
granting the domestic agricultural industry additional time to
192. See Chen & Gu, supra note 190, at 1178, 1186 (noting that the goal of
safeguard measures is to promote healthy trade and increase the competitiveness of
domestic industry).
193. See Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 189, art. 5 (stating that a member
country shall only apply safeguard measures "to the extent necessary to prevent or
remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment").
194. See Terence P. Stewart, et al., Opportunities in the WTO for Increased
Liberalization of Goods: Making Sure the Rules Work for All and That Special
Needs are Addressed, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 652, 65 (2000) (discussing that the
purpose of safeguard measures is to provide a release from the tension brought
about from high levels of global competition); see also Chen & Gu, supra note
190, at 1186 (reiterating that the second purpose of safeguard measures is to
increase the competitiveness of domestic industry).
195. See supra notes 65-89 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S./China
bilateral agreement, which will continue to be slowly implemented until 2005); see
also Bhala, supra note 9, at 1512-18 (outlining current safeguard measures that
China is gradually reducing or eliminating). China is in the process of reducing
tariffs in general and specific tariff rates for U.S. priority products. Id. at 1512.
China further agreed to eliminate import quotas by 2005. Id.
196. See Bhala, supra note 9, at 1511-19 (listing the various commitments China
made in the bilateral agreement). China promised to reduce tariffs by 2005, with
the majority of the reductions in place by 2003. Id. at 1512. The tariffs for
agricultural commodities will be reduced by seventeen percent by 2004. Id. China
further agreed to eliminate import quotas on industrial goods by 2005. Id.
790 [18:753
CHINA 'S COMMODITY INSPECTION LAW
improve itself. 97 In order to keep the faith of international exporters,
China must find other methods to increase its economic efficiency. 198
To increase the efficiency of its domestic agricultural industry
without implementing additional safeguard measures, China should
focus on eliminating obsolete agricultural farming related laws and
increasing domestic use of agricultural technology. 9 9 If China
implements additional safeguard measures, there are two likely
results. First, foreign exporters may lose faith in China's dedication
to the WTO system and, under Article 14 of the Agreement on
Safeguards, use the WTOs dispute settlement mechanism. 00 Second,
the United States or any other WTO member country could retaliate
by implementing safeguard measures specifically against Chinese
products.20' This would be detrimental to Chinese exporters and
further harm Chinese producers by restricting access to foreign
markets for their products.202
197. See Huanxin, supra note 36 (reporting that the amended law would take
effect on October 1, 2002).
198. See Mastel, supra note 104, at 988-89 (noting that China has repeatedly
failed to live up to international agreements and treaties, creating much concern
over its WTO membership).
199. See discussion infra Part III.D (stating ways China could improve its
agriculture industry); see also Chen & Gu, supra note 190, at 1176-77 (discussing
problems with China's domestic agriculture industry). China could change its
current system of granting administrative agencies control over agriculture
production and distribution. Id. The Chinese government can also increase
agricultural efficiency by increasing the level of agricultural technology used by
Chinese farmers. Id. at 1176.
200. See Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 189, art. 14 (stating that the
Dispute Settlement Understanding of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994
apply to the settlement of disputes arising under the Agreement on Safeguards).
201. See Wise, supra note 65, at 574-75 (reviewing sections of the PNTR law
that deal with safeguards against Chinese products). Unlike the Agreement on
Safeguards, which forbids any WTO member from imposing safeguards against
products from a particular country, the PNTR law specifically allows the United
States to implement safeguard measures against Chinese products. Id. at 574. The
PNTR law further allows the United States to implement safeguard measures for
twelve years following China's accession to the WTO, where the Agreement on
Safeguards only grants an eight-year grace period. Id. at 574-75.
202. See Stewart et al., supra note 194, at 655 (explaining that countries use
safeguard measures as retaliatory measures in order to decrease particular imports
that damage domestic industry);, see also Wise, supra note 65, at 574-75 (noting
that the U.S. PNTR Law specifically allows the United States, or other WTO
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B. REFORM INEFFICIENT STATE ENTERPRISES
In order to improve its agricultural industry, China should reform
its inefficient SOEs instead of providing additional protection for
them.2°3 The Chinese government has protected its domestic SOEs
for so long that they have lost the ability to manage themselves and
to compete efficiently. 4 In order for China to improve the efficiency
of its domestic companies, the government should focus on revising
the laws surrounding its SOEs. 205 The first step the Chinese
government should take is to repeal the SOE Law and consolidate
SOE governance under the Corporate Law.2 6 This will simplify
corporate governance and help establish corporate autonomy for all
companies, including SOEs.2°7 The government should also create
new bankruptcy laws that apply equally to SOEs and non-SOEs.2 °8
In order to compete effectively with foreign companies, China's
SOEs must shed their governmental protection and improve their
member countries, to implement product specific safeguard measures against
Chinese products).
203. See Bhala, supra note 9, at 1482 (noting U.S. concerns that government
agencies and SOEs control nearly seventy-five percent of the Chinese economy);
see also Yuan, supra note 3, at 196 (explaining that many SOEs in farming are ill-
prepared for increased global competition). China must continue to reform its
SOEs in order to create more efficient enterprises capable of global competition.
Id. at 216.
204. See Thomas Li-Ping Tang & Fuyu Tang, The Changes of the State-Owned
Enterprises in China, 10 INT'L HUM. RESOURCES J. 6, 3 (2001) (stating that a
major problem with the SOEs is the long history of poor management). The
Chinese government has not been concerned with the productivity or efficiency of
SOEs, but instead has focused on product quantity and value. Id. at 4.
205. See Yuan, supra note 3, at 216 (explaining that China must successfully
revise its SOE system in order to comply with WTO obligations).
206. See Schipani & Liu, supra note 30, at 28 (arguing that China should repeal
the SOE Law in order to allow the Corporate Law to govern all SOEs and other
companies).
207. See id., at 28-29 (explaining that application of Corporate Law will not
only simplify corporate governance but may also help SOEs establish their own
legal independence).
208. See Corporate/Debt Restructuring, supra note 32, at 22 (stating that a
drafting committee in the NPC is working on drafting a new bankruptcy law). This
law will have a broader scope than the current bankruptcy law that applied only to
SOEs. Id.
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management skills and overall efficiency. 2 9 Historic management
practices have revolved around the practice of bribery; China must
change this to implement a "rule of law" system.1 0
Joint venture companies will provide one of the most effective
methods for Chinese firms to learn to compete with foreign firms.2 1
Within the last twenty years, the number of joint ventures operating
within China has increased substantially, helping Chinese industries
break away from state aid and increase their competitive
capability. 21 2 U.S. companies and exporters will also benefit from
joint venture companies by having and exploiting a direct connection
to China and one-fifth of the world's population.2 3 China must also
seize this opportunity to improve the efficiency of its farmers by
upgrading the level of technology used by Chinese farmers. 214 For
example, SOEs must work with the government to gain access to
better information technology that will help agricultural SOEs
increase efficiency and understand changing markets.21 5
209. See Li-Pang Tang & Tang, supra note 204, at 7 (discussing the challenges
facing Chinese SOEs). Management must focus on providing leadership to the
company through developing business and management skills. Id.
210. See Ott, supra note 167, at 151 (explaining that China's shun of a "rule of
law" system combined with inefficient SOEs has led to a system revolving around
bribery).
211. See Li-Ping Tang & Tang, supra note 204, at 8 (listing the numerous
advantages SOEs can realize from forming joint ventures with foreign firms,
including absorption of foreign technologies and management practices).
212. See id. at 8 (contending that joint ventures will help Chinese companies
develop on their own because the Chinese government does not want to interfere
with foreign companies' interests).
213. See id. at 8-9 (arguing that SOE joint ventures are attractive to foreign
companies because of the potential to gain direct access to one of the world's
largest markets).
214. See Chen & Gu, supra note 190, at 1176 (mentioning that Chinese
agricultural technology is below the level of foreign farmers, resulting in higher
costs and lower competitiveness); see also Ding, supra note 5, at 336 (noting that
China's agricultural industry uses very limited technology and that it is very labor-
intensive); Bhala, supra note 9, at 1523-24 (suggesting that government protection
of SOEs led to Chinese farmers working far less land on average compared to U.S.
farmers).
215. See Li-Pang Tang & Tang, supra note 204, at 8 (arguing that Chinese SOE
managers must utilize information technology to increase their access to market
and company information).
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C. CHINA MUST CONTINUE TO ADAPT TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
REFORMS
To date, Chinese officials have launched numerous legal, political,
and social campaigns to combat social unrest and crime; they must
continue to do so because the amendments to the commodity
inspection law and specific commitments from the U.S./China
bilateral agreement will saturate China's market with foreign goods
and force its corporations to battle increased foreign competition.216
As China implements its WTO commitments and withdraws its
protection of domestic industry, Chinese citizens and industries may
feel threatened and react negatively; this could lead to more incidents
similar to the Yangjiazhangzi mine riot.2"7 The Chinese government
must combat social and economic unrest by focusing on legal
reforms such as the revision of laws that provide protection to SOEs,
employment programs to encourage workers to support themselves,
and political campaigns to explain to its population the benefits to be
realized from WTO membership.2"8 Chinese officials should focus on
informing their citizens that increased access to foreign markets
through non-discriminatory treatment and reduction or elimination of
tariff and non-tariff barriers will benefit China's domestic
economy." 9
216. See Lubman, supra note 144, at 403 (describing China's reaction to the
increased level of crime and social unrest). Some campaigns are designed to
increase the public's belief in government officials and the creation of a "spiritual
civilization." Id. at 404; see also Blumental, supra note 4, at 216 (discussing the
Chinese government's position of guarding against domestic hostile forces in order
to maintain social stability).
217. See supra notes 175-187 and accompanying text (discussing the
detrimental side effects China's citizens and industries will realize due to foreign
competition).
218. See Blumental, supra note 4, at 216 (quoting Chinese officials explaining
that China cannot achieve economic growth without WTO membership); see also
Bacon, supra note 9, at 387 (listing economic and social benefits China will realize
from opening its domestic markets to international trade).
219. See Williams, supra note 23, at 808 (noting that Chinese exporters will
benefit from nondiscriminatory treatment of its exported goods); see also Bhala,
supra note 9, at 1479-80 (stating that Chinese goods will gain from lower tariffs
and reduction or elimination of other non-tariff barriers, mainly from the
elimination of quotas).
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The U.S./China bilateral agreement put China on PNTR status
with the United States, which grants Chinese goods equal access to
the U.S. market.22° PNTR status benefits China's domestic economy
by providing greater access to the U.S. market, allowing Chinese
companies to export more products to the United States. 22' The
Chinese government must inform the public that increased
competition does in fact benefit the domestic economy through lower
product prices and eventual increased efficiency of domestic
industry.2 China must inform its citizens of the benefits of WTO
membership, but also take its time in implementing its WTO
commitments in order to maintain stability, combat social unrest, and
decrease unemployment.223 China's economy will take time to adjust
to foreign competition, and adopting new laws, or revising old laws
too quickly could lead to more domestic struggling and social
unrest.
224
The Chinese government should implement legal, economic, and
social reforms to combat an increase in the unemployment levels. 2 25
China should focus on both strengthening its domestic agriculture
industry as well as developing other non-agricultural industries to
220. See Ott, supra note 167, at 149 (explaining that PNTR status allows China
to export products to the United States and receive the same tariff rates as other
U.S. trading partners); see also CRS Report: 1B93107 supra note 167 (describing
that normal trade relations require the United States to extend the same trading
rights to all trading partners).
221. See Ott, supra note 167, at 149 (noting that PNTR status commitments
require the United States to apply the same low tariff rates to Chinese products that
it grants to all WTO members).
222. See Seita, supra note 173, at 446 (explaining that increased competition
from foreign firms leads to increased efficiency of domestic firms).
223. See Blumental, supra note 4, at 216 (noting that China's main focus should
be toward maintaining social stability and preventing social and political unrest).
224. See Lubman, supra note 144, at 403 (maintaining that recent reforms have
had detrimental effects on China's social fabric).
225. See Blumental, supra note 4, at 212 (stating that the Chinese
unemployment rate has recently increased as a result of distressed SOEs); see also
Ching-Ching, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (discussing Project
4050, a program started by Shanghai's city government to provide employment
opportunities and incentives for the "least marketable members of China's old
command economy").
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stabilize the overall economy. 26 China can do this by eliminating
obsolete laws that grant too much production and distribution power
to administrative agencies.2 China should also focus on increasing
the level of technology used by its farmers and agriculture producers
in order to increase competitiveness and efficiency.228
As China's agricultural industry struggles with increased
competition and unemployment, the Chinese government should
focus legal reforms on developing other industries to accommodate
unemployed workers. 229 The Chinese government should shift the
focus of its agricultural industry away from being labor-intensive by
using the opportunities presented by WTO membership to create
new, non-agricultural, jobs for its population.23° China should
develop other industries by offering educational and training
programs in sectors other than the agricultural industry to increase
226. See Chen & Gu, supra note 190, at 1175-76 (explaining. that China's
domestic agricultural industry has been at the "heart of China's domestic
economy;" however, the government must change the current system in order to
ensure its efficient survival).
227. See id. at 1177 (stating that China's WTO accession forces China to
eliminate obsolete laws). Agricultural commodity prices are distorted and market
adjustment mechanisms do not operate properly because administrative agencies
exercise too much control over agricultural commodities. Id. at 1176-77.
228. See id. at 1176 (explaining that China's agricultural technology is below
the level of foreign competitors, which leads to high costs and low international
competitiveness).
229. See Bhala, supra note 9, at 1523-24 (explaining that Chinese farmers are
less efficient than U.S. farmers and will have trouble dealing with the
competition); see also Suranovic, supra note 171 (describing how the comparative
advantage theory encourages a country to focus on its most efficient industry or
production method); Ching-Ching, supra note 29 (explaining Shanghai's initiative
to encourage the least marketable citizens to become their own supporters). Project
4050 encourages women over forty and men over fifty to start their own businesses
and hire other 4050 workers. Id. The city government will then provide them with
tax breaks and management guidance. Id.
230. See Gao Shangquan, Speeding up the Reform and Liberalization Processes
to Meet the New Challenges for China's Post- WTO Accession, 34 INT'L LAW. 355,
356 (2000) (discussing the opportunity presented by China's WTO accession to
allow China to focus on increasing the exports of labor-intensive products to
"alleviate the employment pressure and stimulate economic growth"); see also
Chen & Gu, supra note 190, at 1176 (noting that, since eighty percent of China's
population works in the agricultural industry, there is an overabundance of laborers
in this industry).
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the employability of unemployed Chinese workers. 31 Chinese
government officials could further support development in new
industries by encouraging joint ventures in those areas.232
D. CHINA MUST TAKE TIME TO IMPLEMENT CHANGES
Implementation of WTO requirements, such as the Agreement on
TBT and the Agreement on SPS, and economic reform could lead to
increased social unrest, unemployment, and instability if the
government handles the requirements improperly. 23 3 Immediately
upon accession, China assumed all WTO regime obligations
including the national treatment obligation, the non-discrimination
agreement, and the reduction of tariffs.234 However, the U.S./China
bilateral agreement does not require China to implement all of its
commitments immediately; under the agreement, many of the
specific commitments call for a reduction or elimination over a
period of five to six years. 35
China's agricultural industry historically has received a high
amount of governmental protection. 236  As China continues
implementing its bilateral agreement commitments, its domestic
231. See Shangquan, supra note 230, at 362 (noting that the Chinese
government will provide training to help increase the re-employment of affected
citizens).
232. See supra notes 211-215 and accompanying text (arguing that joint
ventures provide an excellent opportunity for Chinese firms to enter new areas of
business or become more competitive in existing areas).
233. See supra notes 122-134 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of
economic reforms and the need for the Chinese government to take appropriate
measures to ensure stability).
234. See Bhala, supra note 9, at 1519 (reiterating that upon accession, China
would implement all WTO obligations); see also Kennedy, supra note 48, at 425
(listing the four GATT & WTO "pillars": the MFN obligation, the national
treatment obligation, reduction of tariffs, and the elimination of quotas).
235. See Bhala, supra note 9, at 1511-19 (outlining China's commitments made
to the United States in the bilateral agreement of 1999). China has until 2005 to
finish the reduction of tariffs. Id. at 1512. Similarly, China does not have to
eliminate import quotas on industrial goods until 2005. Id. China's commitment to
reduce import tariffs on agricultural products must be completed by January 2004,
but not sooner. Id.
236. See Ding, supra note 5, at 335 (stating that China has protected its
agricultural industry in order to attain agricultural self-sufficiency).
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agricultural industry will struggle as inefficient Chinese farmers fight
to compete with more efficient U.S. farmers exporting to China.237
China must continue with the trend of slowly implementing its
commitments, while eliminating inefficient SOEs in the agricultural
sector. 38 If China fails to reform its domestic agriculture industry
slowly, agricultural companies and individual farmers will remain
uncompetitive, and China's protection of agricultural SOEs may lead
to forced elimination of those agricultural companies because of their
violation of WTO principles. 39
U.S. exporters must recognize that China cannot amend all of its
laws and remove government protections overnight, and it must
allow China time to level the playing field.240 U.S. exporters must
realize that it is not only China's economic sector that must change,
but China's cultural structure as well. 2 1 By allowing China time for
the domestic economy and society to react to an influx of foreign
commodities and competition, U.S. firms will realize greater
economic gain. 242 If China's economy does not have time to adjust,
there will be little domestic competition for foreign commodities
237. See Bhala, supra note 9, at 1523-24 (explaining that Chinese farmers are
less efficient than U.S. farmers, as the Chinese farm far less land per farmer); see
also Suranovic, supra note 171 (describing the comparative advantage theory).
Under the comparative advantage theory, the country that is more efficient at
producing a product will produce that product and export it to the less efficient
country. Id.
238. See Bhala, supra note 9, at 1483 (noting that SOEs in other sectors will
experience similar situations as the SOE at the Yangjiazhanzi mine).
239. See Blumental, supra note 4, at 202 (maintaining that the conditions of
WTO membership will have the short term affect of forcing many SOEs into
insolvency, increasing the unemployment levels).
240. See Williams, supra note 23, at 792 (explaining that it will take time for the
Chinese government to enact reform and make necessary changes).
241. See Yuan, supra note 3, at 196 (stating that China's state-protected
industries are "ill-prepared" for the global competition that will ensue); see also
Ott, supra note 167, at 150-51 (explaining that Chinese society and culture is very
different than U.S. culture). Chinese culture has an anti-law tradition with
inconsistent rules. Id.
242. See Blumental, supra note 4, at 212 (noting that unemployment has
increased as China has reformed its domestic economy and industries); see also
Lubman, supra note 144, at 403 (explaining that reforms have led to income
disparity and social unrest).
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because unemployment will be high, and Chinese citizens will not
have the ability to purchase U.S. commodities.243
China must learn to follow through with its trade commitments
and move towards a "rule of law' principle.244 U.S. exporters,
however, must understand that China cannot transform immediately
into a "rule of law" society.245 Despite the fact that this
transformation will not be instantaneous, U.S. exporters must have
faith that China will be able to fulfill its international obligations and
open itself to foreign commodities.246 Moreover, U.S. exporters
should grant China the time to adjust and temporarily refrain from
bringing WTO dispute resolution actions against China.247
Notwithstanding China's history with trade agreements, U.S.
exporters must put their faith in China's ability to fulfill its
commitments, as the Chinese government recognizes how important
WTO membership is to its economic survival and success. 248 Chinese
officials realize China cannot grow economically independent of the
WTO and must have the opportunity to fulfill China's
243. See Blumental, supra note 4, at 212 (stating that China's unemployment
rate has increased due to recent domestic economic reform); see also Lubman,
supra note 144, at 403 (noting that recent reforms have had detrimental impacts,
including increasing the income disparity between the rich and the poor).
244. See Blumental, supra note 4, at 208 (explaining that, in 1997, China
followed through on many of its bilateral commitments but that it still had many
issues to resolve).
245. See Williams, supra note 23, at 792 (stating that it is unreasonable to
believe that WTO membership will instantly change China from a "rule by people"
to the "rule of law").
246. See Blumental, supra note 4, at 208 (noting that China has begun following
through on its international obligations). But see Lubman, supra note 144, at 420
(arguing that the ineffectiveness of Chinese legal institutions will impair China's
ability to follow through on its international obligations and commitments).
247. See Yonehara, supra note 6, at 101-02 (contending that a course of action
consisting of a WTO dispute resolution case would not be the best method to
compel China to live up to WTO obligations and implement the "rule of law").
248. See Blumental, supra note 4, at 216 (explaining that Chinese officials
recognize the importance of WTO membership). The government realizes that the
Chinese economy cannot achieve economic growth in isolation from the rest of the
world. Id. Government officials are committed to opening China to the rest of the
world in order to ensure the success of China's economic reforms. Id.
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commitments.249 Failure to transform from a "rule by people" system
into a "rule of law" society will not only cause foreign exporters to
lose faith in China's commitment to the WTO regime, but it will also
violate the WTO's "rule of law" requirement, leading to use of the
WTO judicial system as the means to force China to comply with the
WTO's system.250
CONCLUSION
China's accession to the WTO and the necessary revision of its
domestic laws will continue to open the access to China's domestic
agricultural market for foreign producers.25"' The amended
commodity inspection law eliminated dual certification of imported
commodities, created a unified system that applies to all imports as
well as domestic products, and established stricter confidentiality
guidelines for inspection personnel. 2 The U.S./China bilateral
agreement increased market access by lowering overall tariffs,
eliminating import quotas, granting more freedom concerning trading
and distribution rights, and eliminating non-scientific SPS
measures.2 3 Therefore, China's accession to the WTO will continue
to have both positive and negative effects on China as well as the
United States.254
249. See Bhala, supra note 9, at 1479 (describing that Chinese officials realize
the importance of involvement in the international arena in order to ensure
domestic economic growth).
250. See Charles E. Roh, Jr. et al., Future Challenges: The Proposed Accession
of China, Russia, and Others, 32 INT'L LAW. 883, 894 (1998) (stating that China's
lack of a "rule of law" system has led to bribery, lack of contractual commitment,
and regulation mystery). China's lack of the "rule of law" system and constant lack
of legal enforcement could prove to become a serious burden on the WTOs dispute
resolution system. Id.
251. See supra notes 71-142 and accompanying text (describing the impact of
the amended commodity inspection law and the U.S./China bilateral agreement).
252. See supra notes 71-103 and accompanying text (discussing the many
effects of the amendments to the commodity inspection law required in order to
bring the law into compliance with WTO obligations and agreements).
253. See supra notes 104-146 and accompanying text (explaining China's
commitments made in the U.S./China bilateral agreement).
254. See supra notes 147-187 and accompanying text (highlighting the
economic impact on both the United States and China from increased market
access for U.S. commodities into China).
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In order for the United States and China to realize the greatest
benefit from China's commitments, China must find ways to handle
the pressures of increased foreign competition.255 U.S. exporters must
realize that China's economy will not change overnight; rather, it
will require time to mature into a fair and cooperative market.256
Complying with WTO rules and obligations requires restructuring of
China's economic system and, in many ways, restructuring of
China's social system.2 7
255. See supra notes 143-187, 203-214 and accompanying text (commenting on
the economic, political, and social effects of increased competition for the
agricultural industry and measures China has in place to reduce the detrimental
effects).
256. See supra notes 248-249 and accompanying text (stating that U.S.
agricultural exporters must have faith that China will follow through on its
commitments and patience while China lessens the harsh impact from international
competition).
257. See Yonehara, supra note 6, at 75 (explaining that Chinese culture is based
on Confucian teaching and the ideology of harmony through interaction, not
harmony through formal legalism);Ching-Ching, supra note 29 (reporting that
China's recent reforms erase China's "iron rice bowl" and require its citizens to
"stoop so low-fending for themselves in a competitive market economy").
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